The completion in 1930 of the Turksib Railway, passing close to the Chinese frontier in the Ili region, naturally encouraged Sinkiang-Soviet trade, which in that year passed the level of 32,000,000 rubles. In the following year, 1931, shortly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Urumchi was threatened by Ma Ch'ung-ying, the leader of a Moslem invasion from Kansu, who had already captured Barkul and Komul and was taking over the leadership of a Moslem rising within the province. Since Ma was accompanied by Japanese "advisers" and believed to be backed by Japanese militarists, he was not only a menace to the province but a danger to Soviet frontier interests. Chin Shu-jen, in order to obtain arms from the Russians, and because the rising cut off trade with China, signed a trade agreement in October 1931 which gave Soviet interests new privileges.

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Chinese Policies in Sinkiang

Under this agreement eight Soviet trade agencies were established, at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan. Customs duties on Soviet goods were reduced, and new Sinkiang-Soviet telegraph and radio communications were opened. Chin signed the agreement without authorization from Nanking and without reporting it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for this he was imprisoned when, later, he fled the province and returned to China.

Chin was forced out of Sinkiang by a combination of insurrection, invasion, and a mutiny of "White" (exile) Russian mercenary troops. The insurrection began in the Komul oasis in 1931 and was joined by Chinese Moslem (Tungan) invaders from Kansu. Urumchi was attacked in the winter of 1932 and again in January 1934. In November 1933 an Eastern Turkistan Republic was proclaimed in Kashgar. In the main, the rebellion was brought under control by June 1934; but as late as the fall of 1935 there were still 20,000 Tungans, who had originally come from Kansu, holding out in Guma Bazar on the southern rim of the Tarim Basin. It is estimated that these dark and bloody years cost about 100,000 lives.

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The original revolt in Komul was certainly precipitated by the weak and avaricious Chin. In the winter of 1930 the last Uighur ruler of the ancient principality of Komul died. His son and suc-

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cessor, who was opposed by the people, went to Urumchi to offer bribes for assistance. In the meantime the Chinese garrison commander at Komul advised the Governor to discontinue indirect rule of the oasis as a "native state," and to divide it instead into three administrative districts under appointed magistrates, thus making it possible to collect revenues directly. The advice was accepted, and the "natives" were alarmed by the fact that a new land survey threatened to double or treble their taxes.

The situation that developed illustrates the complexities of a multinational frontier province. Most of the people of the oasis had no strong loyalty to the old ruling house to which they had paid their customary taxes; but they resented the new direct administration which, though established in 1931, declared that back taxes for 1930 would also be collected. There was general hostility to the Chinese garrison commander. At the same time, a minority faction which supported the prince who was claiming the succession feared that he might be arrested in Urumchi.[38]

Into this situation there entered some eighty Chinese non-Moslem refugees from a drought-stricken district in the province of Kansu. The Governor ordered the magistrate of one of the three new administrative districts to provide for them, which he did by expropriating land cultivated by Uighurs. The Uighurs were transferred to new land, not yet brought under cultivation. It is a general tradition in Chinese frontier provinces that settlers of such land should be exempted from taxes for the first few years; but in this case the Uighurs were assessed for the same taxes that they had paid on their old land, while the refugees to whom this land had been given were exempted from taxes for three years. In addition to this injustice, the salt bureau of Komul embarked on a program of forced sales. Everyone was either to buy a quota of salt every day, or pay cash for a "salt certificate."

Revolt was touched off when an "infidel" (non-Moslem) Chinese tax collector tried to force the parents of a pretty Moslem

[38] Tu Chung-yuan, *Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the New Sinkiang*, Hankow, 1938, p. 65 (in Chinese). Actually the prince was not harmed in Urumchi, because while there he bribed Chin heavily.

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girl to give her to him in marriage. The people rose and killed not only the tax collector but the Chinese refugees from Kansu. Thousands joined the revolt. Delegates were sent to Kansu to solicit help from Ma Ch'ung-ying, a young chieftain belonging to the most famous, powerful, and warlike Chinese Moslem clan in Kansu,[89] who was then in command of the 36th Division, who though nominally troops of the National Government were actually his personal followers. With only 400 Tungan cavalry, Ma Ch'ung-ying successfully attacked Barkul, Ch'ichiaoching ("Seven-cornered Well," on the main truck route from Kansu to Urumchi), and Komul. After suffering a wound he retired to Kansu, but returned to Sinkiang in May, 1932.

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Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Chameleon War Lord

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In the winter of 1932 Ma Shih-ming, a subordinate of Ma Ch'ung-ying, marched to the outskirts of Urumchi. Under Chin Shu-jen's orders, the defense of the city was taken over by Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a professional soldier of Manchurian origin. Sheng took command of over a thousand troops who had reached Urumchi from Manchuria. These troops, after fighting the Japanese, had retreated into Siberia, where they were interned. The device of repatriating them to Chinese territory in Sinkiang had enabled the Soviet authorities to strengthen the Provincial Government of Sinkiang with a reinforcement of trained Chinese soldiers. As non-Moslems, they could be counted on to resist the insurrection; as men from the Manchurian provinces, they were disposed to be more loyal to Sheng Shih-ts'ai than to any other officer. With the aid of this force, Sheng drove Ma Shih-ming back to the south.

Then in April 1933 "White" Russian troops in Urumchi mutinied, joined with local Moslems in an attack on the provincial headquarters, and killed Chin Shu-jen's younger brother, who was head of the Military Bureau. These Russian troops had been recruited or conscripted among exiled Russians living in the

[89] He is related both to Ma Pu-fang, war lord of Ch'inghai (Kokonor) Province, and to Ma Hung-k'uei, war lord of Ninghsia Province.

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*175 665 from 1935 to 1937, and Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission from 1938 to 1944. During this period he headed an important and personally profitable mission to Tibet, and supported a land-grabbing colonization policy which did much to turn Inner Mongolian nationalism against China.

His appointment in Sinkiang was backed by General Chu Shao-liang, who has already been mentioned, who was then active on behalf of the C.C. Clique. The most important members of his staff were also members of the Clique, including Tseng Shao-lu, Secretary-General; Teng Chiang-hai, Civil Affairs Commissioner; Yu Tao-yun, Reconstruction Commissioner; and Hsü Lien-chi, Educational Commissioner. Only his Finance Commissioner, Lo Yo-wen, was an adherent of the Political Science Group.

*175 669 By the end of November 1944 Wu had set free most of the Chungking appointees who had been arrested by Sheng Shih-ts'ai;[65] but many prisoners who had no connections with the C.C. Clique or with Chungking remained in jail, and much confiscated property was not returned. Political refugees who had fled to a number of cities in China, and even to Mecca, India, and Afghanistan, were not allowed to return. The passport fee for a merchant leaving the province was first trebled and then multiplied by ten.[66] Inflation and corruption increased to the point where the saying became current in Sinkiang that "one Sheng Shih-ts'ai went out, but two came in."

Opposition to the new trend in Chinese rule was not long in crystallizing. A rebellion broke out in the Ili Valley in November 1944. Fighting lasted for more than forty days, until Chinese forces gave up the city of Kulja and withdrew. This rising, referred to in the Chinese political literature as "the Ining Affair," marked the opening of a new phase of nationalism in Sinkiang.

A regime calling itself the Eastern Turkistan Republic was set up at Kulja, headed by a council of three — an Uighur, a Kazakh,

[65] Yu Han, "Sinkiang Memoir," in *Tu Chih Wen Chai* (*Reader's Digest*), Shanghai, July 16, 1946, Vol. 1, No. 6 (in Chinese).

[66] *Hsin Wen Tsa Chih* (*News Miscellany*), No. 8, Chungking, March 15, 1946 (in Chinese). Under Sheng, the passport fee had been $150,000 (Chinese). By 1946 it had increased to $2,000,000.

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and a "White" or non-Soviet Russian, a resident of the region. The military leaders were Ali Khan Türe, Osman Bator (a Kazakh who later turned against the regime), and Abdugani Bator. Leaders in administration and propaganda were Akhmedjan Kasimi, Rakhimjan Klojaev, and Abulkhair Türe.[67] The Chinese residents of Kulja cautiously declared that they had nothing in common with the oppressive policy of the Provincial Government. The Sibos, holding agricultural land near the city, delivered supplies.[68] Uighurs and Kazakhs joined in the fighting; an important development, in view of the fact that the Ili Valley is the most important region in Sinkiang in which Uighurs do not form the largest part of the population.

An American correspondent who reached the region somewhat later reported that there was "no evidence" to support Chinese charges that the insurgents were armed with "modern Russian equipment."[69] Most of the Uighur troops were in fact without rifles, and were armed only with hand grenades. The most important mobile troops were Kazakh cavalry. After hard fighting through the months of July, August, and September, the Kulja regime extended its control into the Chuguchak region. The insurgent forces then turned eastward and drove to Manass, the important town near which the trade route from Urumchi divides, with one fork leading to Ili and the other to Chuguchak. The fighting at Manass was so severe that the population was reduced from 40,000 to 17,000, and the physical devastation was proportionately great.[70] By this time the Kulja insurgents were reported to have 40,000 men under arms, and were considered a grave threat to Urumchi itself. Crack troops from the command of Hu Tsung-nan, which throughout the war against Japan had been garrisoned in Northwest China to "contain" the Chinese Communists, were sent to Sinkiang, but failed to throw back the insurgents.

[67] *Revolutionary Eastern Turkistan*, Kulja, July 30, 1946, p. 1 (in Russian).
[68] Same publication, Dec. 26, 1946, p. 2.
[69] Frank Robertson.
[70] *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* (*Sinkiang Daily*), Urumchi, February 22, 1947 (in Chinese).

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At this point it was considered necessary to negotiate, and General Chang Chih-chung was sent from Chungking to Sinkiang in September 1945. Although a military man, General Chang, who has since become of steadily increasing importance both in Sinkiang and in Chinese national politics, has never been a war lord basing himself on a territory with troops of his own. After graduating from the Paoting Military Academy and studying in Germany, he was given command of a division and later of the Fifth Army. He took part in the defense of Shanghai against the Japanese in 1932, and later was made Dean of the Central Military Academy, since when he has not held active command of troops. From 1937 to 1939 he was Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government; in 1940 he was aide-de-camp to the Generalissimo, and during the war he was head of the political training board of the National Military Council. Concurrently he was Secretary-General of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, a stronghold of the C.C. Clique. He has never been fully identified with either the C.C. Clique or the Political Science Group, but has been one of the few important men able to co-operate with either of them in specific enterprises. Although his known preference for compromise set him aside from the disciplined authoritarianism of the C.C. Clique, the Clique did not oppose his assignment to Sinkiang to attempt to settle by negotiation a situation that could no longer be handled by force.[71]

In the course of his negotiations with the Kulja insurgents, Chang Chih-chung had to make three journeys by air between Urumchi and Chungking, in September and October 1945 and January 1946. His first meeting with the Kulja delegates was promising. They were willing to abandon the "independence" of the "Eastern Turkistan Republic," if Chungking would grant autonomous self-government to the whole province of Sinkiang.

[71] In 1949, after serving as chairman of a six-man Kuomintang delegation to Peiping to attempt to negotiate peace with the Chinese Communists, Chang Chih-chung — with four other members of the delegation — blamed the failure of the negotiations on the unrealistic intransigence of the Kuomintang, and remained in Peiping, reconciling himself to a Communist-controlled future for China.

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Chang was willing to let Kulja retain its armed forces as a local "peace preservation corps" (a common arrangement in China), but insisted that Chungking retain top military command in the province and full authority over diplomatic relations.

The second conference took place in Urumchi in November, 1945. The insurgent movement had by then spread into the Tarim Basin. In the south of the province the government had lost control of Yarkand and Khargalik, and Khotan was surrounded by armed rebels. Chungking was unable to detach large forces for operations in Sinkiang. Although the war against Japan was over, delicate negotiations with the Chinese Communists were in progress. In this period, therefore, interesting parallel negotiations took place. While General Marshall, although America was regarded as primarily the friend and supporter of the Chinese Government, acted as mediator between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the Soviet Consul General in Urumchi, although Russia was regarded as friendly to the insurgents, acted as mediator between them and the Chinese authorities.

Between October 1945 and June 1946 there were eighteen official meetings and more than ten unofficial meetings. To enhance the prestige of General Chang in carrying on the negotiations, he was made Head of the Generalissimo's Headquarters for the Northwest.

The negotiations resulted in three agreements. The basic agreement comprised eleven articles. Attached to Article Nine of this agreement was a supplementary agreement on the reorganization of the Provincial Government. Both of these agreements were signed by General Chang and by three Kulja delegates — Akhmedjan Kasimi, Abulkhair Türe, and Bakhimjan Klojaev. A second supplementary agreement, attached to Article Ten and dealing with the reorganization of armed forces, was not signed until June 6, 1946 — on which day there was a grand celebration in Urumchi, and Wu Chung-hsin, as Chairman of the Provincial Government, telegraphed to all districts to release political prisoners.[72]

The main agreement provided for adult suffrage, with district

[72] *Ta Kung Pao*; Chungking edition, June 7, 1946 (in Chinese).

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officials to be elected locally instead of being appointed by the Provincial Government. The non-Chinese nationalities were granted the use of their own languages in primary schools, with Chinese to be taught as a compulsory language in middle schools. The Provincial Government was to be partly appointed by the Chinese National Government, partly nominated by Sinkiang provincial delegates. Moslem provincial troops were to be allowed Uighur and Kazakh as their languages of command. Their organization was to be brought in line with the national military establishment, but provincial troops and National Government troops were not to be stationed in the same places.

The first supplementary agreement dealt in detail with the fifteen members of the Provincial Government to be nominated by provincial delegates, and with the offices to be held by them. The second supplementary agreement dealt in detail with the organization, command, and expense of maintenance of Provincial Government and National Government troops, and provided for future agreement as to the places or districts where troops were to be stationed.[73]

If these three agreements had been carried out, the non-Chinese nationalities in Sinkiang would have achieved a large measure of self-determination and autonomous local administration, backed by the preservation of a part of their armed forces. Equality of treatment would have been promoted by this improvement in status. The agreements were, however, never put into full operation. Their implementation was held up principally by the delaying tactics of the C.C. Clique, whose devotion to the "leader principle" required a stubborn resistance to representative government.

Under the first application of the agreements, however, Chang Chih-chung replaced Wu Chung-hsin as provincial Chairman in July 1946. One of his Vice-Chairmen was an Uighur, the other a Tatar. Liu Meng-hsun, a close associate of the C.C. Clique, was appointed Secretary General, with a Kazakh and an Uighur as his

[73] The three documents were first published in full by the official Chinese Government Central News Agency, Nanking, June 29, 1946.

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deputies. Wang Tseng-shan, Civil Affairs Commissioner; Chao Chien-feng, Social Welfare Commissioner, and Ku Chien-chi, Vice-Commissioner of Reconstruction, were all active C.C. Clique members.

With this mixed team, General Chang made a real effort to improve government, at least in Urumchi. A basic law for the province, in ten articles, was immediately adopted. Under this law officials were forbidden to engage in trade, and private banks were encouraged to increase production. Requisitions were limited and tax reduction was provided for, at least as a hope. All district councils and magistrates were to be elected within three months.[74] To implement this law, the government ordered the liquidation of the provincial trading corporation which had been set up by Sheng Shih-ts'ai.[75] (General Chang ordered 25,000 Chinese ounces of opium to be burned in front of his headquarters.) To reduce the danger of riots, intermarriage between Moslems and non-Moslems was forbidden. Taxes in arrears were canceled, and a reduction of taxes was promised for 1947.[76] To cover the budget deficit, General Chang went to Nanking to ask for an annual subsidy of $165,000,000 in Chinese dollars.[77]

More than a hundred Chinese Communists who had been put in prison by Sheng Shih-ts'ai (many of them being men who had worked for him in his reform period), were released by Chang Chih-chung and sent to Yenan in a special convoy of trucks.[78] In taking this step, he was following consistently the line which for some years had marked him as a moderate man who favored compromise. Certainly General Chang was sincere in his efforts to reach a workable compromise in Sinkiang. In a speech at Urumchi on May 13, 1947, for instance, he said, "Whenever I

[74] *Han Hai Ch'ao* (*Desert Tides*), Urumchi, January 1947, pp. 9–11 (in Chinese).

[75] *Ta Kung Pao*, Shanghai edition, August 13, 1946 (in Chinese).

[76] Details of sixteen tax reductions were published as an official announcement in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* (*Sinkiang Daily*), Urumchi, January 12, 1947 (in Chinese).

[77] Same publication, April 11, 1947.

[78] *Han Hai Ch'ao* (*Desert Tides*), Shanghai edition, January 1947 (in Chinese).

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*563 186 tural heritage, and make plain their desire to defend it against Chinese encroachment by preserving their own language, literature, and traditions.

Religious freedom is likewise demanded by Uighurs of all political factions. The Islamic flag, depicting a crescent and star on a red background, flies over the schools in Kulja and Chuguchak. After the break between Kulja and Urumchi, the Kulja group was requested by Chang Chih-chung to clarify its intentions by flying the "national colors" over the schools and military establishments.

*563 186 669 It is apparent that the nationalist movement among the Uighurs has never gone as far as the militant revolutionary stage reached by the Viet Minh and other radical groups in the Far East. The Uighurs seek primarily a modicum of liberties such as will permit them to continue to survive as one people under a government of their own choosing. Important sections of the Uighurs have shown that they are willing to join with other peoples, even including some Chinese, in fighting for these demands.

The past history of Sinkiang, considered together with the latest uprising in the province, suggests that the demands of the various peoples are not likely to be fully satisfied without at least some measure of territorial as well as cultural autonomy. Just how this can be arranged is something that has to be worked out — jointly, if it is to be done harmoniously — by the minority border peoples and the majority Chinese in the country as a whole. Hitherto, however, the range of disagreement is such that it appears to be impossible even to obtain accord on the demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang!

*563 197 The problem is not much easier for the scholar concerned solely with describing the peoples of the province. Any classification into nationalities is impeded at the outset by the dearth of information on the national sentiments of any more than a mere handful of nationalist thinkers. Nevertheless, such concrete data as lie at hand do provide some means for objective analysis of the population. In this connection it is particularly striking

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religionists of other nationalities. During the great uprising of the third quarter of the last century the Moslem Chinese sided for a time with their Uighur and Kirghiz coreligionists against the Chinese-Manchu regime, subsequently came to blows with their Uighur comrades in arms, and with the collapse of the revolt were virtually exterminated by the Imperial forces. The revolts of the early 1930's displayed the same feature of initial alliance, followed by final break, between Moslems of Uighur and Chinese origin.

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If these examples indicate the instability of the religious tie between the Chinese Moslems and others of the same religion in Sinkiang, the harmonious relations which developed later in the 1930's between the Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese demonstrates that under certain conditions the two groups are able to relegate the differences between them to a subordinate importance. It appears then that the Chinese population in Sinkiang is confronted by two possible lines of development. One is to focus around the religious issue all other differences of interest until the process of cleavage results in the formation of two definitely separate nationalities. The other is to subordinate their differences, to the point where religion is no more a barrier to common nationality than it is among Americans, English, and other peoples.

In the past, the precipitant of hostility between Chinese Moslems and non-Moslems within Sinkiang has often been the arrival of reinforcements from outside the province. In every period of insurrection, when war bands of Chinese Moslems from Kansu, Ninghsia, or Ch'inghai (Kokonor) have invaded Sinkiang, the Chinese Moslems of Sinkiang have risen to join them. They considered each other not only coreligionists but kinsmen. Together they not only fought non-Moslem Chinese, but massacred whole communities. When, on the other hand, the non-Moslem Chinese received reinforcements, they were equally savage in their repression of the Dungans. The record in bloodiness was set by the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang. When they took Uighur towns, surrender was usually accepted without massacre because the

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*563 578 669 Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

*563 701 668 Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

*563 701 648 Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendancy of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any one point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

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175 region, in which it had always been strongest; and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the years in which his policy was most active, most progressive, and most successful, bracketed the British with the Japanese as imperialists menacing Sinkiang. Partly as a device for turning the pressure of the nationalisms of the Uighurs and others away from his administration, he directed it against the British. The shadow of Japan over Sinkiang never hardened into the reality of a Japanese invasion or even raid; but in the years in which British policy appeased Japan the shadow of Britain over Sinkiang wore thinner.[16]

The Chinese Revolution Reaches Sinkiang

175 648 It was only after Russian revolutionary influences had become strong and well established in Inner Asia, and after the decline of British power and prestige in the 1930's had obviously begun that the effects of China's own revolution really began to penetrate into Sinkiang. In the 1911 Revolution, all that really happened in Sinkiang was that the title of the Manchu Empire passed to the Chinese Republic. The governing group remained essentially the same, guided by the strong hand of Yang Tseng-hsin. That same strong hand sealed Sinkiang off from the stormy events and heady ideas of the Second or "Great" Revolution of 1925–1927.

175 648 669 Revolutionary developments began with the Moslem and nationalist risings at the beginning of the 1930's, which were rebellions against Chinese rule that turned into revolutions against the traditional social orders of Sinkiang. By an odd twist, however, it was these rebellions that gave the first opportunity of action for those Chinese in Sinkiang whose minds were also turned toward revolution.

There seems little doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, at the time he came to power, was a mixture of the revolutionary and the mili-

[16] For contemporary expressions of Chinese hostility to Britain on the subject of Sinkiang, see Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia*, Random House, New York, 1941, p. 307 and note, citing the most important independent Chinese newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao;* also Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, 1944, pp. 48 and 56, also citing Chinese sources.

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tary adventurer. In the Northern Expedition of 1927 he had accompanied the famous First Army column which was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek with Ho Ying-ch'in as Chief of Staff and Pai Chung-hsi as Assistant Chief of Staff, and had himself served in the Planning Section of the Staff. He had, therefore, watched at close hand those military leaders of the Kuomintang who boldly used class conflict to create a situation in which they could control the balance of power. They developed, and for a time seemed to have perfected, a method of riding the revolutionary tiger without losing control of it and becoming unable to dismount. Sheng Shih-ts'ai may well have thought, when he first assumed power in Sinkiang, that he too could use the methods of revolution without losing control of the process of revolution.

What Sheng Shih-ts'ai faced in Sinkiang was not revolution, but a widespread rebellion which could not be suppressed by force with the military resources at his command. On the other hand, he had no mandate to protect the vested interests of the colonial Chinese families that had long been established in the province. He was a newcomer. There lay before him the opportunity to take command of the situation if he could do so by use of the means available to him.

These means included:

1. Getting material aid from the Russians, in return for preventing Japanese infiltration into Inner Asia.

2. Getting the Russians to repatriate, into Sinkiang, Chinese troops which, after being defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria, had retreated into Siberia and had there been interned. As a Manchurian Chinese himself, he could present himself to these troops as a sympathetic commander, while they in turn had no local political loyalties in Sinkiang, and made him independent of reinforcements sent from China.

3. Concessions to Uighur and other non-Chinese political leaders at the expense of the old Chinese official clique in Sinkiang — a clique to which Sheng was not bound, and whose interests he did not have to defend, if by abandoning them he could create new interests allied to himself and dependent on his new policy.

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175 648 669 As was shown in Chapter III, Sheng's "nationality policy" was worded as if it had been based on concessions to peoples, but was in fact directed primarily to winning over some of the leaders of those peoples, whose ambition was simply to hold offices that had been open previously only to Chinese.

4. The recruiting of a new body of Chinese experts and advisers who, like himself, were not tied by common interests to the old regime, and would support his two bold policies of dealing with the Russians and making greater concessions to the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang than their Chinese rulers had ever made to them before.

The first three points have been dealt with earlier in this book, in Chapter III. They are mentioned again here only because of their connection with the fourth point, which concerns the manner in which the characteristics of the Chinese Revolution became, after so long a delay, transplanted to Sinkiang and began to operate there.

Sheng had no difficulty in collecting Chinese, previously strangers to the province, who were far enough to the left to go along with him enthusiastically in his first years of radical innovation. Between the loss of Manchuria in 1931 and the formation of a united front between Communists and Kuomintang at the beginning of 1937, China was a bitter and disillusioned country. Thousands of ardent patriots, who did not want to follow the Communists, were disappointed in the Kuomintang's refusal to make a stand against the Japanese and its insistence, instead, on continuing the civil war against the Communists. Afraid of the Communists as "too revolutionary," but eager for reform, they were ready to rally to a leader like Sheng Shih-ts'ai who was proclaiming internal unity, democratic reforms, and unlimited hostility to imperialism.

Nor were Chinese who felt this way easily frightened by Sheng's friendly association with the Russians. Many Chinese were in favor of good relations with Russia, in view of the clear menace of Japan. To keep one foreign nation balanced against another was an old Chinese tradition; a great many Chinese

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feared that this technique was being turned against them when they were warned that, because of Russian Communism, they must not seek friendly relations with Russia even in face of the rapidly increasing encroachment of Japan.

In addition to leftists and liberals, Sheng Shih-ts'ai also enlisted Chinese Communists. These were not concealed Communists; Sheng invited them to enter his service, and employed them deliberately for the sake of their techniques of popular organization, and also as economic and financial experts, feeling sure that he could take the upper hand over them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. When, in his opinion, Russia at the time of Stalingrad had become so weak that he thought it prudent to come to terms with the Kuomintang, he arrested both his Communist and his liberal assistants and tortured and killed many of them, including a brother of Mao Tze-tung. Only at the end of the war with Japan were a few of them released from jail and allowed to go to Yenan.[17]

The men of whom Sheng Shih-ts'ai made use brought with them into Sinkiang the thought, the emotion, the methods of organization and some of the factionalism that had been developing in revolutionary China for more than twenty years. Their scope of action, however, did not lie within a Chinese environment. Whether they turned to the problem of strengthening the state or to the problem of reforming society, they found themselves part of a Chinese minority surrounded by peoples of several nationalities, all of them differing from the Chinese, and from each other, in their responses to social and political issues.

In this situation theories of nationalism and the policies based on them became of more and more importance in determining all political alignments. Among the Chinese, at one end of the scale stood those who considered that they must maintain themselves as the ruling people, treating the non-Chinese as subjects. Next to them stood Chinese who, in contrast, considered themselves

[17] For the foregoing information I am indebted to unpublished notes by Miss Anna Louise Strong of her interviews in Yenan with some of these surviving Communists.

cut off. A magistrate of former days, who was angrily aroused by the unusual number of crimes in his district, had all the suspected criminals rounded up and then, merely as a precaution, ordered the tendons of their ankles slit. A murderer once was allotted a terrible punishment. Stripped naked under a hot sun, he was thrown to the hard earth of a compound yard and fastened there with wooden pegs driven through his body. His torturers then secured a live rat under an inverted pot on his mid-section, and left him to die while the sun's rays beat down upon him and the rat ate through his abdomen. Almost as horrifying is the case of the Moslem who came upon his wife with her face unveiled talking across the compound wall to a male neighbor. The husband immediately drew his sword and cut off her head. Throwing it over the wall, he told the neighbor that he could thenceforth have her for good.

Political corruption, too, in former days was rife. The tax burden on the common man was unbearable, and officialdom squeezed for selfish gain. Tax methods were irregular and, since they usually varied from locality to locality, systematic check was difficult. On paper an official would report that he was maintaining a strong force of military but, actually pocketing the monetary difference out of his budget, would only keep about him a fraction of the number of troops reported. Nepotism was commonly practiced and, even if the ugly truth concerning some particular instance did come to public attention, usually little was done about it. Since Han Chinese officials were a small minority and since the people whom they were governing were strange in language and customs, native headmen often obtained important intermediate posts by which they, too, kept their pockets illicitly lined.

Out of this paradoxically alluring and yet repellent atmosphere came finally the Sinkiang uprising of the 1930's and the emergence of a young, well-educated Manchurian Chinese leader by the name of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

643 had met Lu Hsüeh-tsu in Nanking through the offices of a mutual
175 friend, and Lu was persuaded to recommend him to the Sinkiang Military Governor. But when Chin Shu-jen learned of Sheng's background he seemed to fear to take him on; Chin wanted a subordinate, not a possible rival. It was only through third party pressure that Chin agreed to give Sheng his chance. Then, just as the young appointee was about to leave Eastern China, Sino-Russian hostilities over the Chinese Eastern Railway broke out and interrupted normal air transport through Soviet Russia via Vladivostok. Since it was by that route that Sheng had planned to travel, he was forced to spend eight months in Pei-p'ing "reading" again until communications were restored. When the line was at last reopened, he flew through Siberia to his destination; there he was temporarily lodged as a guest of Lu Hsüeh-tsu, who had been his traveling companion. But Sheng did not get to see Chin Shu-jen until over a week had passed; for Lu and the military governor had had a quarrel almost as soon as Lu arrived.

At last Sheng was assigned a position with the General Staff in the Office of the Border Defense Commander of Sinkiang. Not a particularly attractive "boost" for one with Sheng's background, the assignment found him nevertheless immediately setting to his tasks. By 1930 he had worked himself up to the position of Chief of the General Staff in the Office; then, when revolt broke out in Ha-mi, he was made Commander-in-Chief at the Front.

175 Chin Shu-jen, a man weaker than those before him and yet covetously
669 retaining the old exploitation methods, had attempted to monopolize taxes on Sinkiang foreign trade and had given his sons extensive regional authority. This combination had caused such resentment that, apparently with some Japanese instigation filtering in through Mongolia, it surged up in a swelling tide and flung the waves of civil war over the province. The incident which finally precipitated his downfall came with the death of the Mohammedan Prince of Qomul in 1930.

Qomul, the Moslem city known to Chinese as Ha-mi, as late as 1930 had been still under only nominal Chinese suzerainty. But when its prince died his son was "received" into Chinese protective custody; then the ancient principality of Qomul was legally abolished and the region

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broken down into three Chinese counties, Ha-mi, I-ho, and I-wu. From those, according to the existing Chinese law, certain taxes were automatically due to the provincial government and to other Chinese government authority. This alone might have been enough to rouse the Moslems of the old principality, for up to then they had not been accustomed to pay such taxes. But to make matters worse a party of eighty Kansu refugees had been brought by Chin Shu-jen to Sinkiang and allotted some of the Moslem land in the "new" I-ho county. Finally, one of the "infidel" tax collectors tried to marry a pretty Moslem girl. In their fury the Moslems killed the tax collector and the eighty Kansu refugees. The small nucleus of Mohammedan rioters gradually accumulated "thousands" more, and open revolt against the Sinkiang administration began.

The whole affair was an expensive demonstration of Chin Shu-jen's ineptitude for the office of Sinkiang Provincial Chairman. The old Prince of Qomul had been thoroughly hated by his own people, and his demise need not have created such an outbreak. Yet, once the revolt had been started, it assumed devastating proportions.

Two of the rebels went to Kansu and solicited help from Ma Chung-ying. With some four hundred Moslem comrades from Kansu to help him, Ma marched forward into Sinkiang. This was one of the far-famed Ma's of the Tung-kan (Tungan) clan. Born at the town of Hochow in Southern Kansu, he had entered the Ch'inghai army of one of his namesakes, Ma Pu-fang, at the age of seventeen. After a time he had gathered his own Moslem Chinese army about him and swiftly brought his name to notice in Kansu military affairs. So prominent had he become by the spring of 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek had permitted him to enroll in the Nationalist military academy at Nanking for a three months' indoctrination course. When he returned to the Northwest, however, his ambitions brought him rapidly into difficulty with other prominent leaders of the region. He had just suffered a military defeat at the hands of Ma Pu-fang when the call came from Ha-mi.

Ma Chung-ying entered Sinkiang as a liberator, and at first recruits came by the throng to his army, the official 36th Division which

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Nanking had authorized him to command. He attacked Chen-hsi (Barkol) successfully, and then Ha-mi and Ch'i-chio-ching. Though partly victorious in these latter encounters, he was wounded and temporarily retired to refuge in Kansu. He returned to the fray in May, 1932, chiefly assisted by another Moslem, Ma Shih-ming. Chin Shu-jen then directed Sheng Shih-ts'ai, already promoted to the post of Commander-in-Chief at the Front, to march against the rebels. Sheng was so successful that two of the Moslem leaders, Yulbaz and Khoja Niaz by name, fled from the province. Ma Shih-ming, however, had marched to Shan-shan and launched a counter-attack in the winter of 1932. His forces soon were approaching the outskirts of Tihwa, the provincial capital.

At this time over a thousand of the refugee troops of the Northeast Resist Japan Army from Manchuria—then continuing a journey back into China via Sinkiang—began to march down from T'a Ch'eng (Chuguchak) to defend Tihwa. Ma Shih-ming, noting this, withdrew his Moslem forces to San-tao Pa, which commanded access to the rice-producing areas on which Tihwa was dependent. Chin Shu-jen therefore ordered Sheng Shih-ts'ai to take the new forces with him in an attack on San-tao Pa and later Fou-k'ang, another Moslem stronghold. Sheng had just chased the Tung-kans out of San-tao Pa when there came a new turn of events.

A heavy slaughter of Han Chinese had been going on in many centers elsewhere in the province, and within the provincial capital there was a great rice shortage. Chinese military and civilian leaders alike, therefore, had by this time begun to resent the continued fighting; Tihwa had even come to feel that if Chin Shu-jen were ousted from his post as Provincial Chairman the warfare might subside. White Russian troops, consituting a sizable portion of the soldiers upon whom Chin counted for protection, were at the same time restless about poor treatment they had been receiving. This unhealthy state of affairs came to a climax on April 12, 1933, the occasion of the "Four-Twelve" Affair, when these same White Russians announced that Moslems were attacking the city. A mob, entering the gates of Tihwa, rushed forward in a direct attack on the provincial government headquarters. In the midst

of this pandemonium Chin Shu-jen fled out of the city. Provincial military responsibility thus fell directly on Sheng Shih-ts'ai's shoulders. 175 669

Tu Chung-yüan, whose account in Chinese of the New Sinkiang has been exceptionally revealing, continues with the story in this way:

> After Chin Shu-jen had fled, the White Russian Army captured both Chin Shu-hsin, his son, and Commander Ts'ui Chao-chi. Ultimately Chin Shu-hsin was killed because he tried to flee during his trial.
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> It was evening in the city when the White Russian Army opened the meeting. Liu Wen-lung, Provincial Commissioner of Education, was chosen Provisional Chairman of the Provincial Government. Cheng Jun-ch'eng, leader of the Manchurian Northeast National Salvation Army, was named Provisional Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and twenty-four men, including Ch'en Chung, T'ao Ming-yüeh and others, were selected as members of a Sinkiang Provincial Government Maintenance Committee. Liu Wen-lung posited three principles for the meeting: Protection of Chin Shu-jen's life and property; Protection of the Consulate; and Maintenance of order.
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> At the time Cheng Jun-ch'eng was outside the city and did not know what had taken place, so Yang Hsüeh-yüan was sent to get him. Cheng, after declining his appointment three times, finally consented to accept it temporarily. But it was known Chin's appointment of Sheng Shih-ts'ai indicated the latter had considerable power, and some feared that Sheng might help Chin Shu-jen. Pai Yü-hsiu was appointed to see Sheng about taking over Chin's office . . . but was wounded. At the time both Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Yang Hsüeh-yüan were at Cheng Jun-ch'eng's headquarters, and all three of them entered the city together. Cheng continually argued that he and his troops were guests of Sinkiang, and that he could not accept appointment in the province. The people therefore selected Sheng as Provisional Border Defense Commander . . .

Young Sheng Shih-ts'ai, rich in military background, recognized this opportunity for what it was; his military successes had already won him acclaim and the Sinkiang capital was looking for a new military leader. Though Cheng Jun-ch'eng, leader of the Manchurian contingent passing through Sinkiang, might have been first choice, he did not feel free to accept provincial military command. Perhaps Sheng helped persuade him to decline. Sheng was the most eligible leader left and, accordingly, was selected.

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669 Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been placed in a difficult position, and at first there seemed little that he could do. The Tung-kan armies of Ma Chung-ying had cut him off and were bleeding the countryside of Eastern Sinkiang of its sustenance. Everywhere along the road from Ha-mi to Tihwa there was "misery, debris, devastation!" At Ha-mi the shops were closed, their fronts barred with sinister wood shutters. The village of T'ou-p'u had become merely "heaps of clay." At Ch'i-chio-ching the streets were littered and stinking with the bodies of dead horses shot in battle. Movement on the thoroughfares of Turfan had ceased, its commerce was paralyzed and there, too, the shops were shuttered and bolted. Ma Chung-ying had become the "autocrat of Eastern Sinkiang" from Ha-mi to Korla and west as far as Kashgar; by June, 1933, he had entered even Ch'i-t'ai (Ku Ch'eng-tzu) "unhindered" and had begun to push from there towards Tihwa. Behind him, though, he had left a wake of pillaging and poverty. The ruthlessness with which he and his men plundered the countryside and the people earned him hatred even from countless fellow Moslems as well as from the Han Chinese.

Sheng directed the Northeast Resist Japan Army to continue the march against Ma, who was as a consequence forced temporarily into a retreat; but he recovered enough to reform his men into ranks and to capture Turfan. From there, where the North and South Roads of Sinkiang come closest to juncture, he controlled access to both East and South Sinkiang. This news came as a severe jolt to the capital, for revolt had also broken out further north at I-li (Sui-ting), under General Chang Pei-yüan. Representatives of the Chinese National Government took this opportunity to attempt negotiation of a peace between Sheng and Ma. Nanking sent first General Huang Mu-sung, then the late Lo Wen-kan. But both were unsuccessful. Sheng was amenable, yet requested that Ma make Ha-mi his headquarters and take orders from the provincial government; to this Ma would not consent. Instead, at the turn of 1934, he once more marched his armies toward the capital which had just sent its main force in the direction of T'a Ch'eng to put down the Altai uprising of Chang Pei-yüan.

At this point Sheng Shih-ts'ai arranged with Soviet Russia to import

large amounts of war materials—trucks, armored cars, machine-guns, ammunition, and even airplanes. With these and the help of Russian troops from the Altai area, the government forces captured Hsi-hu, on the Altai road, and compelled General Chang to flee ultimately toward an ignominious suicide. Then Sheng turned once more to press home his attack on Ma Chung-ying. Had the Russian matériel not been obtained, Ma might have won the battle of Tihwa. As it was, the Tung-kans were forced to flee back all the way to Toqsun; and Sheng's armies began to block their enemies off, both outside Turfan and in the vicinity of Karashahr (Yen-ch'i). Ma's position quickly became so desperate that he began a long retreat to the southwest in the direction of Kashgar. Sheng's airplanes harried the retiring forces with bombs at Turfan and again at Korla, and it was only by the narrowest margin that the Tung-kan leader squeezed past those towns to Kucha. From there he fled to the comparative security of Kashgar in April, 1934. Yet he was forced to leave even that refuge, for troops of the Northeast Resist Japan Army marched in within four months. Ma is said to have been escorted over the Chinese frontier into Russia, and his whereabouts have since then seemingly been swallowed up in mystery.

Sinkiang was not, however, sorry to see him depart, after the four years of warfare. The desperate people were instead only too ready to heed proclamations which were dropped from Sheng Shih-ts'ai's airplanes urging the populace to make "genuine submission" in return for "rehabilitation" and "safety." An army of Kirgizes, Turkis, Torguts, Taranchis, and White Russians, according to words ascribed to one of the tribesmen himself, had at last been formed "to drive Ma and the Tungans out of Sinkiang." All who followed Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been promised, too, that "a new era" had begun for the province; that General Sheng was going to reorganize Sinkiang administration and bring "order, peace, and security."

On first coming to power in 1933, Sheng Shih-ts'ai concerned himself principally with the handling of dissident factions; soon, however, he issued declarations of radical administrative policy, and then introduced a first, and in due course a second, three-year plan of provincial reconstruction. His program was not at first so effective in South Sin-

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647 In February, 1924, were heard the first rumblings of the
622 storm. The reports of the civil officials and the petitions of the oppressed at last moved the Urumchi Government to action. Orders came from Urumchi, nominally emanating from Peking but really issued on the Governor's sole responsibility, dismissing the Titai and abolishing his post. The General refused to give up the seals of his office and defied the Governor's authority. At the same time, partly for
702 purposes of bluff and partly in order to cut the ground from under the feet of those who accused him of maintaining a paper army, he hastily enrolled some hundreds of recruits and gave large orders in the bazaars for new uniforms and boots. Something had also to be done about the forced sale of wax, the most unpopular of all his impositions. The Titai's pro-
622 cedure was characteristic. He arrested eight of his own wax-
621 distributing agents, charged them with collecting money from the people without his knowledge, and ordered their fingers and toes to be cut off joint by joint in the specially-constructed hay-chopping machine mentioned in a former chapter. Four of the men escaped or bought themselves off, the others were duly mutilated and exposed at the four gates of the city, their several limbs nailed to the wall behind them. One of the poor wretches had already died when I heard about this atrocity, but I had one of the others brought in by my orderlies and cared for by our Indian doctor; the Swedish missionaries did the same for the remaining two, and all three eventually recovered. It may be mentioned that one of them was a faithful servant of the Titai's who, when the latter's great wooden palace at Pakalik caught fire three years before, rushed into the room in which his master lay in a drunken sleep and carried him out of the burning building.

645 But the cup of the Titai's iniquities was full. It will be
669 remembered that on the road to Keriya I had heard of an ominous concentration of troops at Aqsu, 300 miles north-east of Kashgar. Information I received at Karghalik and Yarkand on the return journey showed that a considerable force had been collected and was shortly to march on Kashgar under the command of Erh Taoyin of Aqsu, and that Ma Titai was the objective. On the morning of Sunday 1st June, I had an early morning appointment some miles from the town, and was on my way back at half-past ten, when I was met by an orderly with a message from the Mir Munshi to the effect that there had been fighting at the New

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City and that the Titai was reported to have been killed. I galloped as hard as I could to the Consulate, where I found every one in a state of excitement except D., who was baking scones and cakes for the King's Birthday garden party on the following Tuesday. All our eight orderlies were in uniform, wearing their revolvers—their only arms—and knots of Hindu traders and other British subjects were standing about the grounds discussing the situation and spreading the wildest rumours. The only point on which every one agreed was that the Titai was dead (as a matter of fact this was not the case) and that the troops were coming over to the Old City for his son, the massive outer wall of whose citadel was within a couple of hundred yards of the Consulate gates. I took such steps as I could for the safeguarding of the foreign colony and awaited developments.

At about twelve noon a shot rang out from the Hsieh Tai's citadel, followed closely by another and then by a regular fusillade. Some of the shots came over the Consulate, and I had to make everybody take cover in case of spent bullets.[1] I went to see D. in her small private kitchen, and found her still baking cakes and quite unconscious of the fact that there was a war on. From where she was she could not hear the firing, but when she went out into the garden to feed the rabbits, which she insisted on doing, war or no war, she heard the "ping" of several bullets as they came over. A twig from a tree, cut by one of them, fell to the ground at our feet. The heavy firing lasted about a quarter of an hour, and for the rest of the day there were only occasional shots. After lunch I went round with a couple of orderlies to the gate of the fort to find out what had happened; I was told that the Hsieh Tai was lying dead and that the Government troops were chasing his soldiers about the streets and in the surrounding country, taking prisoner those who threw away their rifles and shooting those who did not. In the afternoon I received a call from a burly, round-faced, ruddy-complexioned, rather pleasant-looking Chinese officer, who showed me where a bullet had entered his thigh during the fighting. He proved to be second in command of the Government troops, the leader of which I was interested to hear was no other than the "Ma Darin" who, as Amban of Uch Turfan, had enter-

[1] Probably no one fired on purpose in our direction, but I understand that in Chinese civil warfare a large proportion of the shots are fired into the air by way of frightfulness.

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tained me at that delectable place the previous September. It appeared that some years before Ma had been Amban of Kashgar New City, and that the Titai had then done him some great wrong; now, for the sake of revenge, Ma had asked the Governor, as a special favour, for the command of the flying column that was to surprise and destroy his old enemy. The wounded officer came on behalf of his chief to ask when the latter could come and call on me, also to apologize for having left us undefended during the fighting. In spite of my protests he insisted on leaving eight very tired infantrymen to guard us. We gave the poor lads a good tea, for they were dead beat, as well they might be; they had marched 20 miles by night, had rushed the Titai's citadel at dawn, marched 6 miles over to the Old City and had stormed the Hsieh Tai's yamen, all since sunset the evening before.

Next day I was able to piece together from various accounts the full story of the affair. It appeared that on 24th May the larger part of the Government troops, under Erh Taoyin, marched ostentatiously out of Aqsu and down the Maralbashi road towards Kashgar. At the same time a picked force of six hundred, under Captain Ma (as the ex-Amban of Uch Turfan was now styled) slipped off along the same mountain road, viâ Uch Turfan, Qaragor and Yai Dōbe, which we had followed on our way to Bai the previous autumn. The main body, under Erh, halted at Maralbashi, but Captain Ma's men, in seven forced marches, reached a secluded spot among the Artush hills, to the north of Kashgar, within easy striking distance of the New City. They had no difficulty in capturing the few scouts the Titai had out in this direction.

On the night of our dinner-party (Saturday, 31st May), Captain Ma and his men marched rapidly to the New City and waited outside the gates. The Titai, over-confident as usual, and imagining that his enemies were still several marches from Kashgar, had omitted to take the most elementary precautions. His soldiers, of whom he had several hundred in the citadel, were all asleep or under the influence of opium, and the gates were opened as usual at dawn to admit the villagers crowding into market with their produce. The Titai was asleep in his immense new wooden palace, a four-storied affair, painted red and elaborately decorated with grotesque carvings and frescoes. Captain Ma and a small band of picked men made their way straight to the palace, fired some shots into it, and called upon the Titai to surrender.

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He replied with a volley from the windows, killing an officer and two men. Captain Ma and his party dashed across the courtyard and up three flights of stairs fighting all the way, until at last they forced an entrance into the old man's bedroom. The Titai fought like a tiger at bay, wounding one of the party, but Ma with a lucky pistol-shot in the right arm disabled him and took him prisoner. With the capture of their formidable "King" the soldiers of the Titai, who had meanwhile been fighting with Ma's men in the palace and town, broke and fled. Only four or five of them were killed, the whole affair having taken place in less than a quarter of an hour and having been a complete surprise. The wounded tyrant was bound and taken to an inn outside his citadel, while the invaders looted his palace, which was full of valuables, chiefly in the form of opium, silks and jade. Telegrams were exchanged with Urumchi, and next day the Titai paid the penalty for his crimes. He was put up against the main gateway of the citadel and riddled with bullets, on the very spot where the bodies of his victims, alive or dead, had so often been exposed *pour encourager les autres*. His corpse was left there for a couple of days tied up to a kind of cross for the people to insult and defile, which large numbers of them did with the utmost gusto.

On the Tuesday I rode with a friend to the New City and returned the call which Captain Ma had courteously paid me the previous afternoon. The slayer of the Titai, a quiet easy-mannered little man with aquiline features and steady dark eyes, took me all over the fallen tyrant's palace. It was an immense wooden structure with four stories and a pagoda roof, painted dark red and covered with grotesque frescoes and wooden figures of symbolical birds and animals. I had heard much about this palace, which had only just been completed; more than once I had peeped through its outer gates with a slight shudder at the thought of the sinister power which had called it into being. It was a curious sensation to find myself climbing flight after flight of steep stairs and entering a large central bedroom lavishly decorated with crude paintings. The walls, the ceiling and the great bed-alcove were all splintered with rifle- and pistol-shots and littered with arms and accoutrements, piles of ammunition-boxes, great-coats, and so on, for Captain Ma's soldiers had taken possession of the place. From the new palace we were conducted to the Titai's old Yamen along a kind of raised way, carried on

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trestles, over the roofs of the houses and the streets of the bazaar; this was the Titai's "Royal Road," along which he had been wont to walk between his old and new residences without soiling his feet with the dust of the bazaar. Between thirty and forty ladies of the Titai's harem were still living at the old Yamen when the blow fell; I was told that they were being treated kindly by our old friend Mr. Wang, Magistrate of the New City, in whose charge they had been placed. A horrible, toothless old major-domo of the Titai's showed us, with ghoulish gusto, over the warren-like zenana, still odorous of its late fair occupants, but turned completely upside down, looted and violated. Carpets were ripped up, upholstery torn open, tables and cupboards smashed to pieces in the search for treasure; for it was well known that the late owner had invested a large part of his ill-gotten gains in diamonds and other jewellery, mostly Russian revolution loot, which he had bought cheap from across the frontier. And everywhere was jade, great blocks of it, half-polished slabs lying about, broken cups and half-turned bangles littering the ground; for one of the Titai's industrial enterprises had been the establishment of a jade-cutting factory in his yamen, by the simple process of moving half the Khotan artisans bodily to Kashgar and forcing them to work at starvation rates on the jade brought from his mines in the upper Yarkand River basin.

Throughout the whole of that week I was greatly impressed by the orderliness of the proceedings. By the evening of the Sunday on which the Titai was captured all was quiet, and there was no disorder on the part either of the conquerors or of the conquered, who in Chinese civil war are usually more dangerous to the civilian population than their rivals. If it had been the Persia of my Kerman days, every shop in the bazaar would have closed at the first hint of trouble and half the population would have been taking refuge (*bast*) against one side or the other. As it was, the only effect of the general excitement was an all-round rise of about 10 per cent. in prices. This satisfactory state of affairs was entirely due to the thoroughness of Governor Yang's preparations and the efficiency of his lieutenants; for there is no doubt that if the dispositions of the Higher Command had been less skilful or the revenge-seeking Captain Ma less bold and swift in his movements, the course of events might have been very different. The Titai and his son, knowing that it was war to the death, were preparing to defend the New and Old Cities

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647 respectively; and if they had not been taken by surprise several days before they thought the Governor's troops could •669 possibly reach them, there would have been much more bloodshed and many civilians might have lost lives or property.

538 The joy and relief of the Kashgaris at their deliverance knew no bounds. The popular feelings were amusingly expressed in a ribald ballad, which was being sung within two days of the Titai's execution, if not sooner. It described with much gusto the defeat of the "Bald Wax-Seller" by the Government troops, his capture and his subsequent execution, by "Ma Darin." The poetry of this effusion was not of a high order, but some of the quatrains showed considerable *verve*. Here are a few specimens:

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The wily Ma Darin
He brought his Kalmuck lads
He fell upon the New City and took it
He seized the Bald Wax-seller and shot him.

By Allah! a wind arose
By Allah! a tempest arose
The soldiers of the Bald Wax-seller
By Allah! they have fled away.

The Bald Wax-seller who slept on cotton-wool
The Bald Wax-seller who lolled in his carriage
Who founded the city of Frogtown [1]
Four bullets were enough for him and he is gone.

Though he boasted in his pride
His soul was in the hands of God;
Weep not, O people of Kashgar
Your city too is in God's hands.

The fate of the Titai's harem was a matter which excited the keenest interest among the scandal-loving Kashgaris. Another of the quatrains ran as follows:

In the palace of Ma Titai
Forty vases of flowers are left;
The wives of Ma Titai
On an evil day are widowed.

[1] The Titai built an immense palace at Pakalik, 12 miles south of the New City, but as mentioned above it was burnt down. The name means "full of frogs," for which reason the Titai changed it to Sukho and forbade the use of the name Pakalik.

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change Sheng's loyalty. Sheng reaffirmed his loyalty to the Chinese government. Russian advisers, trade agencies, and troops were withdrawn from the province. Relations with the Soviet Union were interrupted. In 1944 Sheng was recalled to Chungking, upon Russian demand, it was said, and promoted to a nominally high position. Chinese national troops were reinforced in Sinkiang, Soviet sympathizers were purged, and the central government regained control.[25]

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But the government's success was not to last very long. Also in 1944 the Soviet Union resumed interest in Sinkiang and – perhaps by coincidence, more probably not – at the same time a revolt broke out in the Ili area against the Chinese government. Within one year the rebels conquered the country down to the Manas River and declared the three northwestern districts of Kulja, Chuguchak, and Altai the independent "Eastern Turkestan People's Republic." The remaining two-thirds of the province stayed under central Chinese control. The rebels had justified grievances, but without the moral and perhaps other support of the Soviet Union it is not likely that they would have gone so far.[26]

General Chang Chih-chung was sent to negotiate with the rebels. He did so, the Russian consuls at Kulja and Urumchi serving as intermediaries, a circumstance which lent credibility to Chinese claims that the revolt was Russian-engineered. In 1946 an agreement was reached in which some slight concessions toward autonomy of the Ili group were made This was followed from the central government by a few mild attempts at improvements in the administration and occasional conciliatory gestures. But the after-effects of the corrupt, despotic, and mismanaged administration of Sheng remained too pronounced, and the number of Chinese and pro-Chinese officials too great to please the rebels. The Chinese reforms under the slogan "Peace, Unity, Democracy" carried no conviction. The rebels demanded independence and engaged in strong anti-Chinese propaganda.*

The rebel-controlled and the Chinese-controlled parts of the province remained divided into watertight compartments. There were no direct relations between the rebel territory and China. On the other hand, the rebel area had close relations with the Soviet Union. Sinkiang minerals

* A few years after Sinkiang had become Communist-controlled, this line was changed. The people were then told that their struggle had formed "part of the general movement of the revolution of the Chinese people" and that nationalism was "unjustified" under a Communist regime.

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flowed freely to the west. All communications with the outside world went through Russian channels.

By the spring of 1949 a pro-Russian trend developed in the Chinese-controlled area as well. The Ili group used it immediately by pretending to veer toward the Chinese government and suggesting closer cooperation with the provincial government. The approach that took place between the rebels and the Chinese turned out to favor the Communists. For a few months later, in September, Sinkiang went over to them.

This was only one of several developments which permitted the gradual expansion of Russian influence and control over the province. There were also international complications which arose from numerous border incidents between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. In every incident the Chinese government considered the Russians involved and sent its protests to them as well as to the government of Outer Mongolia. Naturally the Russians never admitted any part, though they confirmed that the Outer Mongolians had Russian-trained pilots and Russian-made planes with markings "very similar" to those of the Russians.

The Russian explanations of the incidents varied. Sometimes they claimed the territory involved was not Chinese at all; or they claimed that the incidents had been provoked by the American consul; or they maintained that the Chinese had provoked them because they "liked what was going on in Greece" and wanted American aid. No settlement was ever reached, and until Sinkiang became Communist, the incidents continued, all, somehow, tending to favor the Soviet Union.

The Chinese government had been aware of this trend and tried to stop it. Simultaneously with its protests and angry outbursts, it tried to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union by which the Russians might be satisfied in return for withholding their support from the Chinese Communists or other groups friendly to Russia. Taking up a suggestion by the Soviet Union of early 1947, the Chinese early in 1949 began to negotiate treaties for trade, mining rights, and air communications. They hoped to kill two birds with one stone: by increasing but specifying Russian rights, they hoped to limit Russian penetration into Sinkiang and to strengthen their own hand against the Chinese Communists.

The reported Chinese plan was to give Russia a three-way monopoly: a monopoly on trade in Sinkiang's raw materials, in return for the supply of finished goods; a monopoly on mining rights, to be exploited by enterprises run jointly by Russians and Chinese; and a monopoly on civil

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aviation in the province. These proposals were not as radically new as might appear. In many respects they merely confirmed and legalized a situation which already existed in fact.

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Since 1939 the Russians had had a monopoly on air traffic in Sinkiang (with the exception of a direct line, Urumchi-Shanghai), and their planes landed in several places controlled by the Ili rebel group. The Chinese National Assembly, in an attempt to put pressure on the Soviet Union, had called upon the government to cancel the 1939 agreement. The government announced its intention of doing so. But when the negotiations were terminated, an agreement emerged in which Russian privileges were extended for another five years, instead of the twenty-four asked for by the Russians. The government had not even succeeded in making the Hami-Ata line a less Russian and more Chinese affair.

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In mining and trading the Russians already had a monopoly in the "Eastern Turkestan People's Republic" and wanted to extend it to all of Sinkiang. The Chinese objected on general principles. At the same time they wavered and were considering what concessions ought to be made to reach their political purpose of satisfying the Russians. The indecision reflected the split within the cabinet over the insoluble problem of how far Russia ought to be satisfied in order that it might stop supporting the Chinese Communists. No treaty was ever signed with the National Government. The Communist government later concluded agreements with the Soviet Union through which the Russians obtained in Sinkiang what they wanted.[27]

The Chinese government's position was indeed an unenviable one. Its attempt to stop the double-barreled attack by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists by appeasing the one in the hope of weakening the other was obviously a choice among evils. The policy had its opponents inside the cabinet and failed to find favor with large sections of the public. Yet with occasional rescues by Chiang K'ai-shek, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh succeeded in maintaining himself and his policy in power against all attacks until early 1949. It was a policy in which the Chinese government relied on good relations with the United States to counteract bad relations with the Soviet Union. Depending upon the response from Moscow and Washington at any given moment, of course, relations with both had their ups and downs. The basic theme of this policy, as Wang described it, was close cooperation "forever" with the United States and "moderation" and strict enforcement of treaties with the Soviet Union.[28]

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631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.
175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian inhabitants in general.

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175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking, the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
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175 minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
657 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
563 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
● 669 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784, 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

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175 II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode of Economy of the Minorities.

631 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic con-
619 glomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
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175 political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
631 of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
668 again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
178 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
619 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
648 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road, Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

SN 563 182 II. Stability of the Societies in the Northwest

It is safe to say that the minorities of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu represent rather unstable societies. This instability has several causes. The first is certainly the fact that the Turks, the Mongols and the Tibetans consider themselves utterly different from the Chinese in regard to race, religion, language, and ethnic grouping; therefore they desire independence and do not want to be ruled by "aliens," which they consider the Chinese to be. The second reason for instability is the progressive settling and colonization by Chinese peasants who cut down the pasture areas of the nomadic Mongols, Turks, and Tibetans, and consequently provoke hatred against themselves. The third reason for the unstable character of the societies of the Northwest was the reckless taxation of the minorities by many Chinese officials who considered their offices in areas like Sinkiang and Chinghai as an opportunity to gain wealth while holding those offices for a limited number of years. In periods of wars, the minorities were subject to merciless requisition of their cattle and agricultural products. In addition to the friction and animosity between the minorities and the Chinese, the disunion among the minorities themselves was at times considerable. As an illustration one might remember that during the uprisings of the Dungans between 1931 and 1936, the Chinese Muslims fought against Turkic Muslims (which supposedly represent a single religious unit), Mongols, Chinese, and White Russians fought against the Chinese Muslims (Dungans) and the Kirghiz and Kazakhs even formed a special unit and fought against both groups or joined one of the two according to the military situation, opportunistically. This period was without doubt the culmination of disunion and confusion among minorities of the Northwest during the last decades.

SN 563 635 182 On the other hand, when a governor who was more interested in the welfare of the country as such than in his own enrichment, like Sheng Si-ts'ai of Sinkiang, with a cleaner officialdom, ruled the province, the society gave a more stable impression and the frictions between the various nationalities decreased.

SN 563 798 182 A further reason for the disunion of the society in the Northwest is the incompatibility of various religions, especially the "martial" Islam on the one hand and the more peaceful Buddhism on the other. The Muslims feel superior to any other religious community; the Buddhists (Mongols, Tibetans, Shera Yögurs, Monguors) consider the Muslims as having a barbarian religion; the Chinese, generous and tolerant in regard to religions consider at least Islam to be somewhat inferior to their own multi-religious conceptions and beliefs.

SN 563 182 The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

SN 563 668 [641] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the nationalistic feeling of the minorities. The price the minorities SN [177] have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

SN 563 829 Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

SN 563 668 578 669 The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

SN 829 Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission. SN 829 571 The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

175 159 635 669 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen. Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. These Torguts were located in the Tienshan Range above the oasis of Karashahr, on the northern slopes of the Tienshan, and on the southern slopes of the Altai.

The Bato Setkhiltu League was composed of three banners of Khoshuts who lived on the Yulduz plateau in the heart of the central Tien Shan.

The Ching Setkhiltu League, which included three banners of Khoshuts and seven of Urianghai, was located in the Chuguchak-Altai area in northern Sinkiang.

The Chahars in the Borotala Valley, and the Oirat in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash rivers in the Ili region were not included in the leagues.

However, the Chahars and Urianghai are not true Western Mongols. The former were transplanted from Chahar by the Manchus after the conquest of Dzungaria in the eighteenth century; the latter are descendants of tribes who originally lived in what is now Tannu Tuva.

Through Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts, Sinkiang remained neutral in the civil war that raged in China in 1926-27. His troops kept out the forces of the "Christian General" Feng Yü-hsiang. On his own initiative, he negotiated a new treaty with the Soviet government permitting Soviet consulates to operate in Sinkiang even after the National Government broke off relations with Soviet Russia in 1927. With the establishment of the National Government at Nanking, Yang wired his acknowledgement of, and allegiance to, the new government, which confirmed his position as governor.

2. Governor Chin Shu-jen

Yang Tseng-hsin came from the southwestern province of Yunnan and during his rule many men from Yunnan had followed him to Sinkiang. In 1928, a fellow Yunnan official, allegedly with the connivance of the Chinese Communists and the Russians, murdered Yang at a banquet in his honor. The military commander Chin Shu-jen, who was believed to be implicated in the assassination plot, immediately suppressed the revolt and put the ringleaders to death. He then maneuvered himself into the position of governor.

Under Chin, the government of Sinkiang virtually disintegrated. Corruption was rife. Chin himself set the example for rapacity. He ruled in open defiance of the National Government at Nanking to the extent of concluding, on his own initiative and without the cognizance of Nanking, a new agreement with Soviet Russia in 1931. The agreement permitted Soviet authorities to establish eight commercial agencies in Sinkiang and to have complete control over telegraph and radio communications, thus increasing Soviet influence in the province. The deterioration of economic conditions, heightened by spiralling inflation and the exploitation by Chin's minions, oppression, and inequities, led to widespread discontent. The situation was ripe for

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The rebellion began at Qomul (Hami), where at the death of the old prince, the Chinese had taken over the region and divided it into three administrative districts under the rule of Chinese magistrates. Then, with the influx of refugees from Kansu, Chin ousted the Uighurs from one of the three districts to provide land for the refugees. To make things worse, the Uighurs had to pay taxes while the Chinese refugees were exempted for three years. Finally, when a tax-collector forced a pretty Uighur girl to marry him against her will, the Uighurs rose in anger and killed the tax collectors and the refugees.

When Chin sent troops to put down the rebellion, the Uighur rebels sought the aid of Ma Chung-ying, a young Chinese Moslem (Dungan) officer from Kansu. Entering Sinkiang in 1932 with 400 men, his [648] force was soon swelled by local recruits. The Japanese, seeking an opportunity to intervene in Sinkiang, were believed to have given him guidance and moral support, if not actually funds and military equipment. Barkol (Chen-hsi) and Qomul (Hami), as well as large areas of eastern Sinkiang, fell to the arms of the young conqueror. However, his attack on Urumchi was beaten back by a young Manchurian officer, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whom Chin Shu-jen had brought to Sinkiang to take command of the army.

[648] Sheng's defenders were later reinforced by Manchurian troops, who had been interned in Soviet Siberia and who were repatriated and sent to Sinkiang. They were called the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army.

With the arming and augmenting of both the provincial government army and the rebel forces, the civil war increased in ferocity and intensity. There was a heavy slaughter of the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, and the Uighurs. Meanwhile, the Russian mercenaries stationed at Urumchi, whose pay had been in arrears, also revolted. In the pandemonium, Chin fled the city and found refuge in Russia. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to the fore to take control over the army and the civil government.

3. Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai

175 Although frustrated in his assaults on Urumchi in 1932 and again
159 in 1934, Ma Chung-ying was able to expand his power from Qomul
635 (Hami) westward to Kashgar, hemming in Urumchi from all sides.
669 In his marches back and forth across Sinkiang he left wide swaths of pillage and rapine, death and desolation in his wake. His far-ranging depredations were the signal for other bands of insurgents to rise. The Chinese military commander of Ili raised the banner of independence. In the Tarim Basin, the local Han Chinese and Chinese Moslem residents had banded together into an Eastern Turkestan Army to defend themselves against the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. In November, 1933, a group of Burut chiefs, assisted by returned-students from Turkey, seized control of the Eastern Turkestan Army and established an Eastern Turkestan Republic at Kashgar. In their newly-drafted constitution, they stated that the structure of their government would be based on the Koran, and all decrees and laws

175 159 635 669 also would be based on the Koran. Emissaries were sent to seek aid and support from Moslems in Afghanistan and India where the Pan-Islamic Movement was then in full swing. Telegrams were sent to the Nationalist Government of China and to the League of Nations requesting recognition of their state. Not only did they fail to obtain support and recognition from abroad, but they were also repudiated by their own people. Once in power, they embarked on a terroristic program of persecuting the Han Chinese and the Chinese Moslems who were the mainstays of the Eastern Turkestan Army. Then, too, they were weakened by internal dissensions and by the struggles of the leaders for power, until one by one they were killed. The Eastern Turkestan Republic was finally dissolved when Ma Chung-ying attacked Kashgar in June, 1934.

[648] Meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai reached an agreement with the Soviet authorities whereby he received planes, trucks, armored cars, machine-guns and ammunition. While Soviet troops operated in the region of the Altai Mountains, Sheng's forces marched north and succeeded in routing the insurgents at Ili. Again he led his army south against Ma Chung-ying. His possession of superior armaments turned the scales in the battle of Urumchi. Ma Chung-ying fled,

[506] harried by Sheng's warplanes, which bombed and strafed the rebel columns at Turfan and Korla. He went to Kashgar in April, 1934. Four months later, again forced to evacuate Kashgar, he crossed the border into Russian Turkestan and was never heard of again.

The civil war in Sinkiang had lasted for four years of wholesale destruction and bloodshed. Weary of strife and disorder, the people were ready to accept Sheng Shih-ts'ai's proclamation of a new and stable government and his promises for a new era in Sinkiang. When he first came to power in 1933, he announced an eight-point policy that had gained him considerable support. The eight points were: 1. racial equality, 2. religious freedom, 3. immediate and equitable distribution of farm relief, 4. financial reform, 5. administrative reform to clean the government, 6. extension of education, 7. promotion of self-government, and 8. judicial reform.

Under the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Uighurs and Kazakhs were appointed to high posts in their own district governments. The non-Chinese nationalities were encouraged to use their own languages and to organize their own schools. The number of students in schools increased from 3,000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and many non-Chinese students were sent abroad to study in Soviet Russia. The Sinkiang Daily was published in seven languages, and cultural associations were established for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Dungans (Chinese Moslems), Tartars, Russians, and Chinese.

When he finally had suppressed the rebellions and firmly established the authority of his government, Sheng Shih-ts'ai announced his Six Great Policies for New Sinkiang: 1. anti-imperialism, 2. kinship with Soviet Russia, 3. racial equality, 4. honest government,

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175 5. peace, and 6. reconstruction. After the years of tyranny and
159 misrule, the government which Sheng created in Sinkiang in com-
635 parison was enlightened and progressive, although, because of the
669 characteristics and background of the region, it was autocratic.

N IV. The Rise of the Communists

*175 While Sheng Shih-ts'ai was consolidating his power in Sinkiang,
*668 events were taking a dramatic turn at the other end of the vast
669 territory which comprises China's Northwest. The nucleus of the first Communist guerilla bands appeared at Paoan in northern Shensi in 1931. By the following year, when they came under the overall direction of the Political Department of the Chinese Communist Party headquarters at Yulin, they controlled eleven counties. The poverty of the region made the people receptive to Communist propaganda. In 1935, the Red Army, which had been driven out of Kiangsi, reached northern Shensi after a long and circuitous trek through southwestern China. Here they were under attack by government troops until December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek, who was visiting Sian, was detained by Manchurian troops stationed in the area. Under the terms that the Nationalist Government accepted to secure the release of Chiang, the policy shifted from fighting the Communists to outright opposition to Japan. With the pressure on them removed, the Chinese Communists immediately began to expand in all directions. In the months that followed they occupied 24 counties (18 in northern Shensi, 5 in Kansu and one in Ninghsia). They controlled a population of two million in what was known as the Shen-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.

Their headquarters at Yenan, in northern Shensi became the Mecca of the Chinese Communists and fellow-travellers. From here tentacles of Communist strength stretched out to North China, Inner Mongolia, and to Sinkiang where some of the Communist agents found service in the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. During World War II, the Communists were unable to penetrate southern Shensi, where the government had stationed an army. The Communists also made little headway in Ninghsia, in the regions held by the Chinese Moslem general, Ma Hung-k'uei, and in Chinghai, held by another Chinese Moslem general, Ma Pu-fang. In both these provinces, the Moslem population repudiated Communism and resisted Communist forces.

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175 The Nationalist Government's preoccupation with the war
159 against Japan permitted Sheng Shih-ts'ai to govern Sinkiang as a
648 virtually independent ruler. For seven years, until 1940, he main-
[635] tained his policy of kinship and orientation to the Soviet Union rather than to China and his nominal superior, the Nationalist Government.

After 1941, when German armies overran and occupied eastern Russia, and the Soviet government, engaged in a violent struggle for survival, could not continue to send him supplies, he broke his ties

175 with Russia and sought to return to the fold of China. The National
159 Government had been waiting for this opportunity. Immediately it
648 dispatched officials to Sinkiang to take over the administration from
[167] Sheng's underlings; Nationalist troops under Chu Shao-liang and Ma Pu-fang were sent to overawe Sheng's army; and another tide of Chinese colonists invaded Sinkiang and were settled in the vicinity of Urumchi.

Under these circumstances, Sheng Shih-ts'ai tried to shift back to Soviet Russia. Moreover, by this time, Russian forces had rolled the German invaders back from Leningrad and Stalingrad and were steadily advancing. In 1944, Sheng ordered the arrest of Chinese Nationalist officials and also of students and teachers from China Proper. His coup failed and the National Government removed Sheng from the governorship of Sinkiang and transferred him to Chungking to the sinecure position of Minister of Agriculture. This was the end of the colorful career of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. A trusted Nationalist official, Wu Chung-hsin, was appointed as governor of Sinkiang.

One of the many problems that Wu Chung-hsin inherited from
175 Sheng Shih-ts'ai was that of the Kazakhs in Ili. In 1940 Sheng had
159 arrested 70 Kazakh delegates from the Altai region who had come to
• 669 protest his high-handed treatment of their people. When news of the
[563] arrest reached the Kazakhs, they revolted en masse, led by one of their chieftains, Osman Batur. After sporadic fighting between the rebels and provincial troops, Sheng agreed to negotiate and to release the prisoners. However, before they were released, a number of them were executed. Incensed by this act of treachery, the Kazakhs in the Altai region revolted again. They put up a strong resistance but were finally overwhelmed by Sheng's forces. Osman Batur fled.

When Sheng turned against the Russians and attempted a rapprochement with China, Osman Batur organized the Altai-Kazakh Restoration Society. With arms from Outer Mongolia and the tacit support of Soviet Russia, he attacked and captured Ching-ho, Ta-cheng (Chuguchak) and A-shan (Altai). He was besieging Wu-su in 1944 when the new governor, Wu Chung-hsin, decided to negotiate. In the settlement of this uprising, which has been called the "Ining (Kulja) Incident", the Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops from Kulja and to grant the Kazakhs semi-autonomy in the territory they held which included Kuldja, Ta-cheng and A-shan. The new Eastern Turkestan Republic was established at Kulja. It had a government headed by a council of three, a Kazakh, a Uighur, and a White Russian. One of the leaders, Akhmejan Kasimi, was placed in charge of administration and finance; another of the leaders, Osman Batur, headed the army, which at one time was reported to number 40,000 men.

175 By November, 1945, the Ili rebellion had spread to the Tarim
669 Basin and insurgent forces surrounded Yarkand, Khargalik, and Kho-
[648] tan. At that time it was denied that Soviet Russia gave any military

175 669 648 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thanking the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane. The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese authorities.

175 669 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese government delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October, 1945, to June, 1946. The insurgents were willing to abandon their independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy. The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agreement were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial government composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates. The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur, and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice in political affairs.

175 668 669 578 563 However, realization of these agreements, which would have given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to the native leaders, the extremist native leaders were impatient and uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements, led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government. Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

175 563 578 [635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

175 578 648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

175 578 669 668 [635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrended and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

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N B. Population Problems

563 1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

578 Of the many problems in regard to the population of North-
669 west China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems
648 and the Chinese, together with its international complications,
175 is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i.e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

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648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

S 2. The Uighur Autonomy

642 Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became
177 the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National
[668] Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

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167 A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has
708 occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day
466 Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

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642 "Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang,
668 the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with
177 the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

/Chinese Moslems/

S N 795 795 792 185 equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

S N 795 792 [669] Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

S N [578] After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

S N 795 Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jahrivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriva

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civil marriage, marriage and divorce ceased to be an important function administered by the qadi.

Thousands of religious scholars and intellectuals, denounced as counter-revolutionaries, were arrested. The people's courts tried some thirty thousand Moslems, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. Soviet forces were reported to have joined the Chinese Communist troops in suppressing the anti-Communist uprisings, in which it is estimated that 130,000 Moslems were slaughtered, 260,000 sentenced to forced labor and 150,000 fled from Sinkiang. [Figures based on Hikmah (Indonesian weekly), July 23, 1955, in Missionary Bulletin, January 1954, and report of Mochtar Gazali, member of the Executive Council of the Federation of Indonesian Moslem Labor, in Missionary Bulletin, July 1953.]

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But the persecutions have failed to wipe out opposition from large segments of the Moslem population. As late as the spring of 1956, it was still charged that "counter-revolutionaries" were hiding in religious circles and "under the cloak of religion they carried out various kinds of destructive activities." (Report of Su Chen-yung, vice director of the Bureau of Public Security, Kansu People's Government, in Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956.)

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B. Lamaism

As was the case with Islam, the present regime has also tried to placate Lamaism as a device to attract the loyalties of the Lamaistic peoples, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Famous Lama temples were kept in a good state of repair, Lamaist priests and dignitaries received subvention and a certain restraint was shown toward interfering with strictly religious practices (for details see IMAR Handbook, Religion). More particularly, the two highest priests of Tibetan Lamaism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, both 'teen-agers, by the way, were kept at Peking for long periods of time and shown around at international gatherings.

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Attitudes toward Lamaism as a religion and an institution differ somewhat in the Mongolian and the Tibetan contexts. Generally speaking, it can be said that among the Mongols the influence of Lamaism was on the wane. Even among those Mongols who stuck to their traditions and maintained loyalty to their princes, there was a tendency to break loose gradually from the leading-strings of the Lamaseries. Already in pre-Communist times, progressive Mongols supported this movement. The Regent of the Alashan Mongols, for instance, had made it a rule to submit Lama novices to compulsory secular education and military training in order to educate them out of Lamaism. No reports are available on how Mongolian Lamas have reacted to

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern [167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese
578 The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the tradi-
669 tional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebel-
186 lions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar) but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration [648] the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II. Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later were organized into special units and joined the fighting against Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies
779 Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the domain os Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine, but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

apparent trade of innkeeping was simply a cover for another and more lucrative business." (p. 73).

Like the Chinese, the sinicized Moslems are very much concerned with the problem of offspring. To them continuity of life is bound up with that prolongation of existence which a son secures, one who carries on the life which he owes to his parents. This is a completely Chinese concept. The Chinese-speaking Moslems cannot understand and would certainly not accept the Christian faith that life after death is God's gift, that one does not depend upon a son and his worship, and that immortality means the soul or spirit living eternally in Heaven. Miss Cable records in her book: "We talked often of these things, but it was hard for them to understand what I told them, and they would turn it off with one excuse or another. 'She is different from us', they said, 'her life is given up to God's work and her merit will secure her an entrance to Paradise'. Some envied, some pitied, some just stared and made no effort to understand, others summed it up in these words: 'Eastern ways are for the East, Western ways are for the West.'" (p. 75).

The Chinese-speaking Moslems in the Northwest, in spite of their having taken up a considerable amount of the Chinese way of life, are deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability to Chinese rules. Most of them are always rebellious. They alwasy think that they are oppressed or unfairly treated by the Chinese authorities. For this reason, Moslem revolts occur in the Northwest frequently. For example, the immediate cause of the the 1930 revolt was, according to Miss Cable's account, the suspicion of the Moslems that the Chinese Government was to change their age-old social and political system and that the Chinese population in the area goat many advantages at the expense of the Moslems. Up to 1930 the Moslems in the Hami district of Sinkiang were always governed by a ruler of their own race, religion and speech. The last one of their rulers was Khan Maksud Shah. This ruler died during the year 1930. The Chinese Sinkiang Government took this opportunity to end the Moslem system and the succession of the Khan was not allowed to continue. Maksud's son, Nazir, heir to the throne was summoned to report at Urumchi, then capital of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and Yolbars, the Tiger Prince, was ordered to appear with him. This was bad news for the Moslem inhabitants. Later, a word came from the capital that the young prince had been made a prisoner in his own lodging, and that there were to be many changes in the standing of the Turki people. When Yolbars returned to Hami he left Nazir in Urumchi, and arrived in company with a band of Chinese officials who at once sat down to business and drew up a list of changes which were to be introduced in the administration of the Moslem community. The old administration

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

S 563 642 643 177 829 The old administration of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his people were one, and they understood each other well. His Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became the more bitter when a great display of highly organized officialdom was made.

S 563 177 631 642 829 [423] At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully surveyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magistrates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-collectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital, where they would be allocated to the respective departments. These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority and they were presented to the people as improved measures of justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal of suspicion towards them. There was also the rumor that some unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.

S [669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a "breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on revolt.

N 829 565 [651] Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to

N 565 181 562 829 social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very conservative in matters which have anything to do with their women. Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have anny opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations between the two sexes were resented by the local people because they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding

N 565 829 181 their bad impression of the government and their resentment toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are

attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of politics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the Communist Central People's Government were the same men who had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-appointed, were all worked into the Administrative Council of the Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the Northwest, but not in a basic change in the composition.

The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Communists who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops, who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ninghsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and Sinkiang.

Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes: the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Republic of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties, such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions. They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since 1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant, Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Com-
175 munists. In September, 1949, Akhmejan Kasimi was killed in a
631 plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Con-
635 sultative Conference convened by the Chinese Communists.
554 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern Sinkiang.

175 Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of
631 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the
635 strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum
648 following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority
669 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin, in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully
668 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under
669 their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause, even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-
668 made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to everyone in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to different factions working together for the Communist government.

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

175 668 [793] [346] [995] mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central People's Government and the Resist-America and Aid-Korea campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association, which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yü Chan-lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the people's government ...have been conveyed to the masses of various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups), so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). As for the future, Yü urged further propaganda on "patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements, intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patriotic campaigns and experiences in various political activities, thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 669 578 175 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression of the opposition, whom the Communists designate as "counter-revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups: (1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur, Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)



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668 make use of reactionary elements of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-
669 Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of
578 operation." (JMJP October 1, 1950).
175 The extent of opposition to Communist rule may be seen in
N the news dispatches issued by the Communist authorities on the
#175 results of their relentless crack-down of the counter-revolution-
#668 aries:
669 Item: September, 1950, liquidation of 58,000 bandit troops who
578 refused to disarm and continued to resist.
S Item: November, 1950, arrest of 6,249 Kuomintang agents and
175 seizure of 208 special service cells and 275 radio stations.
668 Item: February, 1951, capture of Osman Batur and Jamin Khan
669 and escape of Yolbars Khan to Formosa. April, 1951, Execution
578 of Osman Batur.
Item: 1951. Revolt of workers in the Yen-ch'ang Oilfield, Shensi.
Item: December, 1950, Suppression of the Taoist secret society, the I-kuan-tao, which claimed to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Members of the organization were charged to have infiltrated into farmers' associations and sabotaged the land reform and peasant organization work.

Despite the savagery of the suppression, the Communists were unable to snuff out the opposition. Kan Ssu-ch'i, director of the Department of Public Security of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, pointed out that in the province of Kansu alone, the counter-revolutionaries killed and wounded 2,117 native cadres resulting in a profound demoralization of the people. "The people blame us," he said, "for having only government and no law. We must...by means of accusation meetings, exhibitions, public trials and forums, mobilize the broad masses to partake in the work of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries." (NCNA, April 7, 1951).

The alibis for the failure to wipe out the opposition in the Northwest was attributed to many causes. T'ao Chih-yüeh, deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military District, charged that "hidden enemies are utilizing old relations, old friendships and all opportunities for winning over and buying over a few backward elements." Ma Hung-pin, vice-chairman of the Kansu provincial people's government, warned the people to renounce their old friendships. "All counter-revolutionaries," he said, "be they your relatives, your friends and your neighbors, or even your family members, must be denounced." (NCNA, April 7, 1951). Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, charged that "the imperialists" were fanning the fires of "narrow nationalism" by spreading rumors and fostering animosity among the minority peoples and they have seized upon pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as their weapons." (JMJP, October 2, 1951).

The admonition and the threats by the officials had no effect

in curbing the hostility of segments of the population towards the Communist regime. Sabotage as well as open rebellion continued unabated, as the following items, culled from Communist papers, show:

Item: November, 1951, arsonists set fire to the Urumchi Fur Factory causing a loss of two billion yuan (US $100,000).

Item: April to July, 1952. Revolt of Chinese Moslems in Kansu, who killed over 3,000 Communist cadres and many government officials and seized control of three districts.

Item: March to June, 1953. 1,380 "bandits" reported annihilated in southern Kansu.

Item: December, 1953, Suppression of "bandit" forces under Ma Liang in the Kansu-Chinghai-Szechwan border region.

Item: First half of 1954, 3,420 counter-revolutionary cases unearthed.

IV. United Front Work, 3. The Cadres

A. Recruitment of Cadres

The placement of non-Communist and non-Chinese leaders in the government and the organization of the people, while important, were but subsidiary tasks. The principal task was the reform of the old cadres and the recruitment of new cadres to serve as the work forces of the party and the state. The job, which was a part of the building of the "democratic United Front" since it concerned the integration of Communist with non-Communist employees, was handled by two agencies of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: the Department of Organization, headed by Ma Wen-jui, which was responsible for party expansion, and the Department of United Front Work, headed by Wang Feng, which was responsible for recruiting and integrating non-Communists and non-Chinese functionaries in government and party work.

The shortage of trained cadres and the need for more were felt by the Communist authorities from the beginning of their rule over the Northwest. In November, 1949, barely a month after the Communists took over the vast territories of the Northwest and two and a half months before the formation of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, Ma Wen-jui, who had already set up his Department of Organization, declared that the main problem facing the Chinese Communist Party was the training and employment of new cadres (JMJP, January 4, 1950). The need was particularly urgent in view of the depletion of trained men due to the transfer of many of the veteran cadres of the old Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to other parts of the country and the reluctance of the local youth to become cadres. Hsi Chung-hsün, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, pointed out that the number of men who had

175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March, 1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough." (Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party committee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

175 Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
668 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
414 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
578 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors. As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leadership center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
578 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study, refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
[794] areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[575] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
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counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal" religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.

By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings. Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging technical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely committing errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religious circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March 18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people, which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Communists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from the people as the program for socialism gets under way.

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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Introduction

A. Historical Administration of Area

1. Ch'ing Dynasty

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*175 During the Ch'ing dynasty, Shensi and Kansu were two of the
635 eighteen provinces which formed China proper. The police
625 system and the problems of public order and safety were simi-
184 lar to those of the other provinces. (See Section on Public Order and Safety in General Handbook.) However, in the Chinghai area, the maintenance of order was mainly entrusted to the native local chiefs. In Sinkiang, a network of military garrisons under the rule
S of Manchu military officers was established. Its main purpose was
175 to suppress possible rebellions by the minority groups. The daily
701 administration and maintenance of order among the minorities at
669 the lower local level, however, here also rested with the minority chiefs and local leaders. The efficiency of this system is illustrated by the record of the riots. Periodically, at intervals of roughly thirty to fifty years, a major rebellion broke out. Numer-
N ous small riots occurred between the big conflicts. As a whole,
*175 however, the Ch'ing dynasty's maintenance of public order in the
625 northwest was considered to be successful.

2. Post 1911

When the revolution came in 1911, the situations varied in the different provinces. The weakness of the central government in Peking helped further the development of local forces. In Shensi, Kansu (and Ninghsia) and Ch'inghai, there were various warlords who occupied and dominated a certain portion of the land at various times. The purpose of the police forces under the warlords was to maintain their dominant position. Their police forces were efficient or less so, depending on the personalities of the leaders. Often they were backward and cruel, but usually they followed the traditional pattern of the Chinese bureaucracy. Most of the warlords adopted the "closed-door" policy. Outsiders, especially those viewed as potential trouble-makers, were not too free to travel around. This simplified police work since the local population was comparatively less educated and, except for the Moslems, more submissive than the outsiders.

S In Sinkiang, the situation was complicated by two factors.
175 First, it was exposed to foreign agitation, particularly from Russia
625 and Great Britain. Second, it had a mixed population with the
[648] Chinese in the minority. Therefore, the purpose and mission of
[363] the police forces in Sinkiang were traditionally difficult. Maintaining the leader's power involved dealing with foreign influences and with the various local peoples. These constant challenges made the police forces in Sinkiang more alert and efficient than in other

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*175 military riots on a large or small scale.... The Chinese at Tien-
*563 tzu-wa of Ku-yuan county (in Kansu) were unwilling to be annexed
*668 to Chang-hua-tien where the Moslems were the majority. They
669 repeatedly petitioned to the county government, but the county magistrate insisted on upholding his own opinion.... This ended in the tragedy of the magistrate being beaten and numerous people murdered." (Ibid., p. 444).

3. "(NCNA Sian, December 10, 1950)"

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175 "Bandit remnants remaining in Sinkiang, native bandits,
579 and special agents working for the US-Chiang elements, led by
668 Ulachibai, Stiga and Pulungchiafu who had been determinedly pur-
669 sued by the People's Liberation Army, were forced on December 1 to surrender their force of 127, bringing with them 70 rifles, 4,000 rounds of ammunition, and a number of horses.

"Ulachibai, a Kazak, was formerly the puppet (i.e. Nationalist) deputy magistrate of Chinghua hsien. Stiga, also a Kazak, was Commander of the Kou-mintang Self-Defense Corps at Nanshan. Pulungchiafu, a Mongol, was formerly puppet deputy magistrate of Ashan hsien, and a company commander of the forces of the bandit Osman.

"During the months of June and July, 1950, the aforementioned three bandits, in collusion with the US-Chiang agent, Osman, undertook to shelter special agents and army deserters, and proceeded with an orgy of rebellion, massacre, and robbery, in the Ching-hua, Nanshan, and Yenki areas.

"For the protection of the interest of the people, the People's Liberation Army, after the successful suppression of the bandit gangs led by Osman, Yollbars (Yolbar), and Janimkan (Janim Khan), since July has conducted operations against the bandit remnants of the three bandit chiefs.

"After overcoming many difficulties, the People's Liberation Army finally dealt annihilating blows to the remaining bandits."

An editorial in the Peking Jen-min jih-pao, (December 28, 1950) reported:

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*175 4. "Liu Yung-nien, chief of the technical division of the
669 Kuomingtang's 'Second Bureau' in Lanchow...is an arch criminal, who, after liberation of Lanchow, planted 1,200 mines and destroyed the Hsiang-t'ang bridge."

5. "In the spring of 1952, the anti-Communists guerrillas in the P'ing-liang area of eastern Kansu started two open rebellions on April 2nd and May 8th under the leadership of Ma Hsiao-tung and Ma Kuo-yuan. They attacked the counties of Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan and spread all over eastern Kansu and continued their activities, commented Lo Chun in "The Construction and Management of the Highway in Northwest China," in Chung-kung wen-t'i, No. 3, p. 120.

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*175 6. "(NCNA Sian, September 7, 1952)
*668 The Ang-la tribe is located 300 li southeast of Sining in the
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*175 "Under a call of the correct nationalities policy, Hsiang Ch'ien
*668 yielded to the people in Chiencha in the afternoon of July 11, and
669 arrived at Sining on July 31....
579 "The Chinghai Provincial People's Government has appointed Hsiang Ch'ien to continue to hold the post of chieftain."

S 7. In an article entitled "The great achievements of People's
175 Sinkiang during the past three years", in Sinkiang jih-pao, January
668 1, 1953, Burhan, the governor of Sinkiang, gave the following report:
669 "During the past three years, (1949-1952)...we have wiped out
579 more than 20,000 of the remnant of the KMT bandits, basically cleared out the hidden spies...."

8. In the same paper, in April of 1953 there appeared the following:

N "(NCNA Lanchow April 6, 1953)...Northwest Regional Admin-
*175 istration Council called a meeting of the Kazakh chiefs along the
*563 border of Kansu, Chinghai, Sinkiang at Lanchow from March 23,
*668 to April 3, 1953....The Kazakh chief A-t'ung-pai-k'e said: 'In
669 the past, being deceived by the bad people and believing in the
S rumors, we did not cooperate with the People's government. In-
175 stead of punishing us for our past faults, you are now helping us...'"
563 The above cases all clearly indicated political disturbances.
668 Judging by what has been revealed here, the Communists did try
669 to modify their laws and standards to woo the minority groups. They also did use the minority people as their own agents to police as well as to pacify the resisting minorities.

N 9. (NCNA Sian, February 28, 1955)
*175 "According to statistics of the people's procuratorates in 48
*668 administrative districts, hsien, and municipalities, 3,500 cases
625 were taken on in 1954."

10. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
694 "The Provincial Public Security Department has also dispatched
631 five work teams to various places and adopted a combined policy of
S carrying out penetrating detection, investigation and research to-
175 gether with the resettling of vagrants and the pronouncing of sen-
668 tences with great fanfare. According to incomplete data from
625 various localities during the past 11 months, 71.7% of the crimi-
694 nal cases have been brought to light. The data from the two spe-
631 cial districts of Tacheng (Chuguchak) and Altai, from the two municipalities of Ining and Kuche as well as from Shache hsien reveal that a total of 25 major criminal cases have been unearthed."

11. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
S "Judging from the events that have taken place in our province
175 during the past year, there are still some habitual robbers, habit-
668 ual thieves and other criminal culprits who have not been disposed
674 of. Some elements who have gone through reform through labor or who have been released on termination of sentences still refuse to repent and continue to jeopardize social order. Some landlords

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*175 at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National People's Congress on July 27, 1955:
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*668 "'Chinghai is an area where many nationalities live.... There are hidden counter-revolutionists and reactionary landlords, rich farmers who are still trying in every way to sabotage the unity of the nationalities. The methods used by these enemies for sabotage are dangerous and shrewd, mainly along two lines, namely, under the cover of religion or by upsetting international relations. The counter-revolutionists also sabotage our productive activities through arson, robbery, spreading of rumor, etc. They even organize open military rebellions. The reactionary landlords and rich farmers also stir up trouble between the middle farmers and the poor farmers. They infiltrate into the mutual cooperative groups and cooperatives to sabotage the mutual cooperative movement.'"

14. The Sinkiang jih-pao, September 30, 1954, reported

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"In the first half of 1954 alone, we have discovered 3429 cases of counter-revolutionary plots in Sinkiang. According to incomplete statistics, we have made arrests in at least 15,000 cases of various criminal offenses during the past 5 years." (A Report on the Achievements of the Political Works in Sinkiang Province during the Past Five Years," by Vice-chairman Kao Chin-ch'un of Sinkiang Province.)

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[674] The above reports clearly indicate that there have been disturbances, resistance, sabotage and open rebellion besides ordinary crimes in every province of the Northwest from the very beginning of the Communist conquest until the present.

4. Conclusion

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625 The regular police system under the Communists is huge, yet it is only a very small part of the whole police system, much like the part of an iceberg floating above the sea level. Strictly speaking, every branch of the Communist government, no matter whether it is legislative, administrative, judicial or economic, is a part of the police system and under the control of the Party. Moreover, every person in the country is organized and enlisted in the secret service. He is watching and being watched. Violators are subject to very heavy penalty. (See "The Regulations for Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries" adopted by 11th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951, in 1952 Jenmin shou-ts'e.)

175 much greater physical barrier than existed on the Turkestan-Man-
648 churian-Mongolian border with Russia.

II. Russian Advance in Sinkiang

In the middle of the last century when the Western powers, including Russia, opened treaty ports along the coast and in China proper, Russia had combined this coastal penetration with an inland advance. In the Treaty of Kulja of 1851, which was made public in 1861, the Russians secured the right to trade in Northern Turkestan by the establishment of trading centers in the Ili valley at Kulja. In the Treaty of Peking in 1860 Russia also secured the right to establish a consulate at Kashgar in southern Turkestan.

175 The Russian-British pressure on Turkestan came to a head in
648 the 1870's when Chinese control was temporarily thrown off by the
669 rebellion of Yakub Beg. This was the period when major rebellions were taking place within China, and the revolts against the ruling dynasty spread to the northwestern border. The Moslem rebellion began in the Northwest region of China and extended to Chinese Turkestan where one of the former ruling Moslem families which had been driven out by the Chinese administration into western Turkestan attempted to re-establish its power. Its leading military figure was Yakub Beg who soon took over the rebellious movement and attempted to set up an independent government over the southern and nortnern parts of Chinese Turkestan. During his stay in power, he negotiated treaties with both Britain and Russia. The British recognized Yakub Beg and permitted him to secure arms through India. A British envoy signed a treaty with his government at Kashgar in 1874, a treaty which was formally ratified by the government of India in 1876. In this treaty Sinkiang was opened to trade with India, and a British trading company was formed with the assistance of India. Through India, Yakub Beg established contact with the Sultan of Turkey in a Moslem religious alliance. At that time, the British believed that Yakub Beg would be able to maintain himself and hoped that Chinese Turkestan would become an independent or at least autonomous area, a buffer between India and Russia.

The Russian reaction to Yakub Beg's rebellion was a direct attack on the territory of Chinese Turkestan. When Yakub Beg had occupied Urumchi and moved towards the northwestern border area, the Russians moved troops across the border and occupied Kulja and the territory of the Ili valley in 1871. In 1872 they forced Yakub Beg to conclude a commercial agreement which opened Eastern Turkestan to Russian trade. In 1874-75, Russia concentrated troops on the border of southern Sinkiang. But unrest in Russian Turkestan prevented them from further military action. In 1876, they forced Yakub Beg to surrender the strategic moun-

175 tain passes west of Kashgar to Russian control. The Russian
648 government had thus used the unrest in Turkestan for military
669 expansion into Chinese territory, although it declared at the time that the occupation was only a temporary move for the protection of Russian commercial interests and that the area would eventually be given back to China.

This Russian attack gave the Turkestan rebellion an even more dangerous character in Chinese eyes. What was at stake now for China was not only the subjection of a rebellious leader but the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asian position. China's realization of this danger became very clear in the discussions that preceded the Chinese military compaigns to reconquer Turkestan. Two views were expressed at that time on the importance of that area to China. One was represented by Li Hung-chang, who had come to power as the leader of the Anhwei army, one of the regional forces that had been established to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. In this campaign Li had had his main base at Shanghai and had come to control the financial resources of the central coastal region. Later his army had been used in the suppression of the Nien Rebellion in Anhwei and Shantung and after this successful campaign he had become governor-general of the capital province of Chihli and was the leading military figure in the north. Li Hung-chang was willing to abandon China's position in Central Asia in favor of strengthening coastal defenses. According to him the expenses of a Sinkiang campaign would seriously endanger the coastal defense, so important for holding the capital.

III. Policy of Tso Tsung-t'ang

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648 In contrast to Li's regional view on the importance of China's coastal area, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then in charge of the suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in the northwestern provinces of Shensi and Kansu, saw the control of Sinkiang as a vital part of the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asiatic frontier. According to Tso Tsung-t'ang, "The reason why great weight should be given to Sinkiang is the protection of Mongolia. In protecting Mongolia, one ensures the defense of the capital. When the fingers and forearms of the West and North work in unison and the topographical position is continuous then there is no break in the country's defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be safe. Not only the border provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Shansi would be constantly open to invasion and it would be difficult to defend them, but also Northern Chihli and Shanhaikuan would not have a day of rest or sleep." (Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, chüan 50, pp. 76a, b.) Tso argued that the defense of Sinkiang would be less expensive in the

175 648 Sinkiang. In 1930 the completion of the Turksib Railroad in Russian Turkestan along the Chinese border enabled Soviet Russia to intensify the exploitation of the Sinkiang economy. Ever since the Russian development of central Asia, the weight of Russian influence had increased and the Chinese National Government lagged behind in its attempt to answer this threat by a new development of the communications between Sinkiang and China.

175 648 • 669 The greatest increase in Russian influence came as the result of the revolt of the Chinese Moslems, the Tungans, in 1931, who called in as their leader Ma Chung-ying, a Moslem from Kansu who came close to capturing the provincial government. Governor Chin's administration was saved by Soviet Russia, which gave him arms and military support under the pretext that some Japanese had been on Ma's staff, implying that Japanese schemes were endangering Soviet interests in the province, although no proof has ever been brought forward for such Japanese activities. In order to get Russian support, Chin concluded in November, 1931, an agreement with Soviet Russia which was kept secret from the National Government. By this agreement, eight Soviet trade agencies were set up at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan; the tariff for Soviet products was reduced, and telegraph and radio communications were established with Soviet territory. Chin Shu-jen did not succeed, however, in suppressing the rebellion, and according to one account by a Mr. Tshumabay, then chairman of the GPU mission in Sinkiang, the Soviets, in order to weaken the Chinese military forces, did not at first provide the military support they had promised. When a Moslem force reached the outskirts of the capital of Urumchi, Chin turned over the defense to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, an officer of Manchurian origin. Sheng was placed in command of Chinese troops from Manchuria who had in their fight with the Japanese retreated on to Soviet territory and had been transported by Soviet Russia to Turkestan. Thus from the outset Sheng derived his military power from Russian support. He was substantially supported by another military force recruited from the White Russians living in Urumchi and neighboring cities. Within the ranks of this force could reportedly also be found Red Russian soldiers. When asked about this comradeship-in-arms the White Russians stated to members of the Sven Hedin expedition that there was no difficulty in working together for a common purpose. The equipment of both these forces was provided by the Soviet Union.

With these troops Sheng succeeded in driving off the Moslem attackers. In April, 1935, a coup d'etat by these Russian troops forced the retirement of Governor Chin, who fled to Russian territory and from there returned to China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai became governor and, with the help of Russian war materiel, including

175 648 669 military planes, succeeded in destroying the Moslem forces of Ma Chung-ying who was eventually driven to Kashgar from where in June, 1934, he fled to Soviet territory. All the three leading figures in the struggle for power, Chin Shu--jen, Ma Chung-ying, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai were thus in different ways under Soviet control. Chin had been supported and at the same time handicapped by the Russians who finally permitted him to return to China through their territory. Governor Sheng, his successor, depended from the very beginning on Russian support for his power. And Ma Chung-ying, the defeated aspirant for power, who might have established a closer link with the National Government, entrusted his fate to the Soviet regime. He was reportedly seen in Moscow at the beginning of 1936, but from that time on his fate has remained unknown.

VI. Policy of Sheng Shih-ts'ai

175 648 From the outset Sheng Shih-ts'ai was strongly under Russian dominance. Soviet Russia did not only have influence over the locally recruited Russian forces and over the Manchurian troops of Sheng, both equipped with Russian weapons; it also sent a special tank regiment of 3,000 men, the so-called "Altai Volunteers," to be stationed near Komul on the main caravan route from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. This force was stationed in a strategic position ostensibly to guard against any Japanese advance from Inner Mongolia. In practice it also could interfere with any attempt of the Chinese National Government to re-establish its authority over Urumchi. Soviet military advisors supervised the training of the Chinese as well as the Russian troops, and through their influence communists were reputedly introduced also into the officer and private ranks of the Chinese forces. They also trained political commissars for the indoctrination of the Chinese forces. In addition to this control of the forces the Soviet government had a hold over the administration of the province. Two Russians, a Mr. Yuravlev and a Dr. Lapin, held high positions in the civil administration of the province and Russian advisers under the direction of the Russian consul-general had decisive influence in all important departments of government. Many of the Turks employed in the administration were recruited from West Turkestan or Turkic groups living in the Soviet Union. According to Chinese reports (see article by Yolbars Khan "Sinkiang Under the Control of Chinese and Russian Communists," Chung Hua Nien Pao, vol. 4, 1954, pp. 52-55), Governor Sheng was told by the Soviet consul at Urumchi that he had to follow Party orders. This was the time when, after the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek, a united front had been established in China proper for the war of resistance against Japan. During the time

175 648 when this united-front continued in operation, in 1937 and 1938, a number of Chinese Communists were brought in who seemed to have worked in close cooperation with the Soviet advisers.

When he came to power, Governor Sheng was given a Soviet loan of five million rubles for reconstruction. For the plans of reconstruction he was provided with Soviet technical advisers. In 1937 Sheng introduced a three-year plan of reconstruction for which he received a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans; a second plan was introduced in 1940. These funds were used to build motor roads, among other things, and to introduce a large fleet of Soviet trucks. It was reported that 1,350 miles of telephone lines were installed by 1941. By 1939 twenty factories had been set up in the province and over four hundred tons of Soviet machinery had been imported for the exploitation of oil resources and the establishment of an oil refinery northwest of Urumchi. In november, 1940, Governor Sheng concluded a secret agreement with the Soviet Union which included permission for Soviet Russia to prospect for and exploit tin and other mineral resources in Sinkiang, and which gave Soviet Russia control over the mineral resources of the province. (The text of this agreement was published in 1950 in Formosa and appeared in 1954 in the American Journal of Foreign Affairs, and in November, 1954, in the German newspaper, Ost-Probleme.")

175 648 669 While extending their military and economic influence over the government of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Soviet government attempted to deal separately with a group of Kazakhs in the Ili and Altai regions who had begun in 1940 to work for an autonomy of their region. When some of their leaders were invited to Urumchi and arrested there at the beginning of 1940, the Kazakhs rose in revolt in February of that year. A truce was concluded on May 15, 1940, in which the insurgents agreed to cease fighting provided that no more Russian troops would be brought into their area. But fighting soon broke out again and the Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, succeeded by the end of 1940 in establishing a provisional government in the Ili and Altai region which was called the National Republic of East Turkestan. A Soviet attempt to deal with the government of Osman Batur failed. Osman Batur turned down the Russian offer of arms which was coupled with a request to withdraw his forces from the Altai region and move them to the Ili area. In September 1941, the insurgent leadership split. Abdulaziz Kasim, a leader who was a Soviet citizen, concluded an agreement with the Soviets, while Osman Batur and his followers continued their fight against Soviet troops as well as the forces of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai. At the beginning of 1942, the Soviets brought 23,000 troops into the Altai area but the critical situation in the war with Germany forced the Soviets to discontinue their campaign and to concentrate on the protection of a few bases in Sinkiang.

175 completed by March 1943. Soviet Russia not only withdrew its
648 military forces but also retreated from its economic expoitation of Sinkiang. The Soviets capped the main oil well north of Urumchi and shipped back to Russia all the movable machinery from the oil refineries and the gold, copper, and iron mines which they had set up in Ili, Chuguchak, and in the Altai area, and from the factories they had built in Urumchi and other cities.

This Russian retreat was, however, far from complete. The Soviets maintained their consulates in all the larger cities of Sinkiang with a staff of several hundred people. At these consulates the Russians left military guards. At Urumchi a company of Soviet infantry with a strength of at least four hundred men was left behind to guard the consulate. Other consulates were guarded by units of ten to fifty men each. Other units were left behind to guard the gold, copper, and iron mines in the Ili and Chuguchak regions as well as the oil wells at Wusu and at Urumchi where the valuable machinery that could not be removed was protected by these troops. Soviet troops also continued to guard the airfields at Kulja, Urumchi, Kashgar, and Turfan. In each Soviet
175 consulate the biggest department was the propaganda section.
648 These departments distributed among Turks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
208 and Mongols pamphlets printed in Soviet Russia. Agents of the consulates traveled throughout the province giving out these pamphlets and explaining the contents to the illiterate. The pamphlets gave favorable accounts of the Turkic people within the Soviet Union and contained material on methods of agriculture, irrigation, and animal husbandry. Altogether, the Soviet consulates concentrated more than before on the support and protection of the nationality groups who had started to fight the Chinese administration. Although the Soviets did not establish Communist Party cells among these nationality groups, they attempts to infiltrate their leadership. And since Chinese policy aimed at the suppression of this nationality movement, the nationality groups depended on the intervention of the Soviet consulates with the Chinese administration for the protection of the lives of their leaders. In several cases the Soviet representatives prevented execution and in other cases secured the release of imprisoned nationality leaders. As a result the Turks, the Kirghiz, and the Kazakhs, and Mongols, had to accept the orders of Soviet agents in their dealings with the administration of Governor Sheng.

175 VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang.
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By 1944 the defeat of Nazi Germany enabled Soviet Russia to return to an active policy in Sinkiang. The Soviets supported a
[669] Kazakh uprising which broke out in the Ili valley on November

175 7, 1944. This Kazakh uprising occurred in the three border
648 districts of Ili, Chuguchak (Tacheng), and Ashan (Altai) and
669 resulted in the establishment of an "East Turkestan Republic."
These districts on the Soviet border were preponderantly Kazakh in population and comprised almost one-sixth of the population of the province. They are rich in oil, coal, iron, tungsten, gold, lead, and reportedly also in uranium; they also have rich agricultural soil. The revolt was in the hands of experienced Kazakh leaders who had been in practical control of much of the area since their earlier uprising in 1940. When they had attempted in 1943 to declare their independence, they had been forced to abandon this plan by the threat of military action from the Soviet troops that were guarding the closed mines in the area. But by 1944 the Soviets were willing to support them. Their uprising resulted in fighting in the Ili valley for over a month until the Chinese provincial troops gave up the city of Kulja which remained under the control of Kazakh insurgents. From Kulja the rebel forces moved north to extend their control over the Chuguchak region and then captured the town of Manass close to Urumchi. The rebellion also spread to some cities of southern Turkestan. When attempts to suppress the rebellion by military forces failed, the Chinese National Government, which by this time was reasserting its authority over Sinkiang, sent General Chang Chih=chung to Sinkiang in September 1945 to negotiate with the rebels. These negotiations were handled through the mediation of the Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi. After many meetings between October 1945 and June 1946, the negotiations resulted in three agreements signed by General Chang and three Kulja delegates. The agreements resulted in the abolition of the "East Turkestan Republic" and of its local flag but they practically secured autonomy
[635] for the rebellious districts and troops. They also resulted in the reorganization of the provincial government. The new governor,
[563] Chang Chih-chung had two vice-governors as his assistants, one an Uighur, the other a Tatar. The appointment of representatives of the nationalities to such positions was an attempt to pacify the revolt of the nationalities against Chinese rule. Governor Chang did not, however, regain any control over the autonomous group which continued to rule the vital border districts of Sinkiang under the leadership of Akmedjan, Burkhan, Isakh Beg, and Saifuddin. The national government troops under Governor Chang did not control the area west of Urumchi and the products of this region, including the oil, coal, and mineral products, went to the Soviet
175 side. From 1943 on the Soviet resumed the working of the tung-
648 sten mines and since 1945 the Soviets have reportedly obtained
[135] diamonds, gold, bismuth, and uranium from this area. An attempt by the Chinese government to end this secret exploitation of

175 Turkestan resources by proposing an open trade agreement in No-
648 vember 1946 remained unanswered by the Soviets.

The Chinese attempt to regain control by Chang Chih-chung's policy of negotiation was based on military measures aimed at strengthening the strategic position. Along the whole route from Lanchow to Urumchi, blockhouses were maintained at distances of about twenty miles. And at the same time a new effort was made to open up the route from Ching-hai. The new Moslem governor of the province, Ma Pu-fang, received Nationalist support in his [491] efforts to build a road from Sining along Lake Kokonor towards the Tarim Basin. This road had been driven well past the Kokonor before the Communist victory in 1949. The National Government [701] had also strengthened the military force in Sinkiang. In addition to the six divisions which Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai had left behin, four divisions of Nationalist troops had been sent to the province and two divisions of Ma Pu-fang's cavalry from Chinghai had also been brought in, bringing the total of Chinese forces up to twelve divisions, or about 100,000 men, which have remained there since the Communists took over.

In spite of this military force, Governor Chang Chih-chung did not succeed in transforming the agreements concluded with the Kulja group in 1946 into a working arrangement. He demanded that the reorganization of the forces of the Kulja area should be preceded by acceptance of Chinese control. He also wanted the approval of the Sinkiang Nationalist leaders for the railroad to be built from China into Sinkiang and the acceptance by Sinkiang of the Chinese Nationalist currency. The Sinkiang Nationalist leaders refused these conditions, and in May 1947, Chang Chih-chung resigned as governor and was succeeded by an Uighur, Masud Sabri, who was a compromise candidate acceptable to the Chinese National Government. In July 1947 the Kulja nationalists broke with Masud [669] Sabri and maintained their own autonomous administration under Akmedjan. The situation remained in a deadlock and the Kulja group was reportedly receiving aid for its troops from Soviet Russia. The Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, who had formerly joined the Kulja group, had broken with it on account of the Soviet support and had withdrawn with his own forces to the Altai border region.

To overcome the deadlock with the Turkic Nationalists, the National government agreed in December 1949 to the appointment of one of the Nationalist leaders as governor of the province. This was Burkhan who was by origin a Russian Tatar and a man with whom the Kazakh nationalists were willing to cooperate. In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung flew once more to Sinkiang to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty. But all these moves by the National Government to appease Soviet Russia by economic concessions and to appease theRussian-supported Kulja Nationalists

175 a change of the provincial administration came to nothing because
648 of the rapid disintegration and collapse of the National Government
(635) in 1949. The Sinkiang Provincial Government had a formal decla-
[668] ration of adherence to the new Communist regime in Peking in September 1949.

IX. Sinkiang Under the Chinese Communists

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After the victory of the Chinese Communists, both Soviet and Chinese policy changed in its attitude toward the Sinkiang Nationalists. While they had been supported and equipped with Soviet arms against the Chinese provincial administration under the National Government, they were now suppressed by the Chinese Communists with Russian help. Soviet troops which were greatly increased and have been estimated as consisting of about 50,000 men during this time were instrumental in defeating the independent forces of Osman Batur who was captured and executed in April 1951 at Urumchi, together with over 13,000 of his followers. The key Nationalist leaders of the Ili area who had been formerly supported by Soviet Russia were eliminated in another way. While on their way to Peking to participate in the opening of the Communist People's Political Consultative Conference, Akmedjan, Isakh Beg, and several other leading figures were killed in an airplane crash on August 29, 1949. The leaders who remained behind, Burkhan and
175 Saifuddin, were willing to work with the Chinese Communists
668 and Soviet Russia along a new line of policy which condemned the
(648) former nationalism and re-interpreted the previous fight in an anti-Kuomintang line. The new leaders were willing to admit former "mistakes: in their nationality policy which had not made a clear distinction between opposition to "rapacious Kuomintang officials, plundering Kuomintang troops, and the oppressive Kuomintang police," and hostility to the "entire Han race." This previous "narrow nationalism" was described as harmful and the aim was now to establish full unity between the formerly rebellious districts and the rest of the province. The Ili armed forces were dissolved and integrated into the Chinese Communist Army and a new policy was introduced of ridding the province of its "feudal oppression."

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This new policy propagandized by both Burkahn and Saifuddin aroused strong nationalist opposition. In 1951, a Kazakh revolt which continued in the Ili area spread towards the east. The movement was attacked by Burhan as representing the "reactionary bourgeois class, such as pan-Turkestanists and pan-Islamists" who were trying to undermine the "solidarity among various races in the People's Republic of China." He stated that "what has been
[661] regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at another time," and ordered the liquidation of all "reactionaries,

175 668 669 661 counter-revolutionaries, and pan-Turkestanists" and demanded that the "people of various races" be taught" the spirit of patriotism and internationalism." Simultaneously, a large-scale purge was undertaken to liquidate most of the original revolutionary leaders in the three western districts who had not perished in the airplane crash of 1949. These leaders were replaced by Chinese Communist cadres. The new policy was carried through with great bloodshed. According to a statement by Burkhan in January 1952, over 120,000 "people's enemies" had been liquidated. About 60,000 people attempted to flee from Turkestan, of whom only about 35,000 survived and reached safety in other countries. Large number of people were arrested and used as forced labor among the construction works introduced by the Chinese Communists under Russian guidance. Bollowing this purge, a re-education campaign was carried on by "friendship delegation from Peking, and in the words of the New China News Agency: "It was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the fatherland." (See Allen S. Whiting, 'Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, January 1956, vol. 25, no. 1.)

175 648 668 669 661 This policy was carried through with the backing of Russian troops as well as the Chinese Communist troops of the First Army Corps which had moved in after 1949. At the time of the Korean war, some of the Chinese troops were withdrawn for Korea, and the Russian forces were reportedly increased from 50,000 to 70,000 men. They were garrisoned along the northern route at each important point.

These Russian troops have thus helped substantially in the suppression of the Turkic nationalism which Soviet Russia had formerly built up and equipped against the Chinese Nationalists. Once before, in 1942, when Soviet Russia partly withdrew from Sinkiang, these nationalists had been left at the merch of the Chinese administration. Many had been arrested and executed, although the Soviet consular officials had continued to intervene on the behalf of some of these nationalist leaders. In 1949, however, the movement was crushed and its very motivation was attacked. Only those leaders survived who were willing to cooperate fully with the new Communist line.

175 648 668 Although the Russians gave full support to the Chinese Communists in their reconquest of Sinkiang, the potential remained for Sino-Soviet rivalry over control in Sinkiang. For the economic development of the province, the Chinese Communists remained dependent on Russian equipment and on Russian technicians. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950, the two governments agreed on the establishment in Sinkiang of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for exploitation of oil and non-ferrous metals in the province. The Soviet control of these companies indicated the political importance of

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*563 III. Resentment of Chinese Rule
578 These internal differences have made it impossible for the people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated government of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
S [162] non-Chinese, yetthe forces of nationalism and of religion, which at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary movement and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

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*175 The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
659 system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
*563 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
578 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as
S an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
175 own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
659 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
563 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
578 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mongols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

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175 In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
• 669 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
648 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
668 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control. Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

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Moslems were rising in China Proper, a descendant of the Khojas was able to move from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he ruled Kashgar and Yarkand. Soon, his chief of staff, Yakub Beg, replaced him and conquered the rest of Chinese Turkestan. Helped by foreign aid and diplomatic recognition, Sinkiang remained independent and under Moslem rule for over a decade. After the death of Yakub Beg in 1877 and the recapture of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-t'ang, the dream of a great Turkic Empire, extending from the Caspian to the western frontier of China, continued to exist. Turanism (Pan Turkism or Pan Turkistanism) gradually came to acquire the ideological formulations of modern nationalism.

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A Moslem uprising of proportions dangerous to the Chinese government broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Ma Ch'ung-ying, who led an army of Chinese Moslems from Kansu into Sinkiang. His defeat in 1934 by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was partly due to the aid of Russia. It regarded Ma as a collaborator and advance scout of the Japanese whose invasion of Central Asia seemed imminent.

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The most recent example of an anti-Chinese uprising culminated in 1944 in the establishment at Kulja of the "Eastern Turkistan Republic." Unlike previous purely Moslem uprisings, the Kulja movement was an expression of "coalition nationalism," and it attempted to unite all the non-Chinese of Sinkiang. The Kulja government was headed by a council made up of an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a "White" Russian. In the years that followed until the victory of the Chinese Communists, there were alternate periods of fighting, negotiations and near co-existence between the National Government and Kulja. The insurgents' chief demand was for autonomy and self-government, rather than for complete independence from China. Agreements, guaranteeing cultural freedoms and substantial independence in the administration of the local government, were made but were never really carried out. In 1947, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landlord, became Chairman of Sinkiang, the first non-Chinese to hold that position. But as he was considered by many members of the Kulja Government to be an agent of the C.C. Clique and the National Government, the movement split for and against him, and a new deadlock was created. In December, 1948, Masud Sabri was replaced by Burkhan at a time when no assembly was in session to accept or reject him. It is difficult to know to what degree the Kulja Government had been swayed by Communist or Soviet Russian influence. Only one thing was certain - the government was strongly anti-Chinese. But with the Communist victory, the entire provincial government of Sinkiang turned to the new regime and a completely new situation emerged.

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Thus, there have been two major types of independence movements in the Northwest, one purely Moslem and the other seeking

collectivize was slight, but the speed toward socialization has been increased greatly especially since the middle of 1955. The plans call for a continuation in the breakdown of privately-owned farms. In Sinkiang the 1702 production cooperatives which existed in 1955 are to be increased to 3469 in 1956. By 1960, 85% of all households are scheduled to be at least semi-socialized. Furthermore, a relatively large number of mechanized state farms have been instituted in the Northwest (China News Agency No. 112.). It is not surprising that these rapid changes, combined with methods of terror and intimidation, should result in peasant opposition. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955.)

4. Religious organizations

Religious organizations have also come under attack. Counter-revolutionaries are suspected of hiding in them and of using them for propaganda activities and espionage. Sinister anti-government activities are attributed to the traditional secret societies, especially I-kuan-tao, which has many branches throughout China and appears under various names. It is estimated to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. Secret society activities have existed among the Chinese Moslems since Tso Tsung-t'ang's invasion of the Northwest. Only now are they being suppressed. It is unlikely that, after such a long existence, the Communists will succeed in completely uprooting the organizations in the very near future.

C. Centers of Resistance Abroad

It is clear that no effective organs of opposition can exist in the Northwest under conditions of terror and in the face of a centralized system of police and military control. All that can be expected is individual terror and sabotage - a method of opposition, nevertheless, that continues to give the administration constant irritation and worry. Moreover, if historical precedent can serve as an indication for the future, a rebellious movement can attain political significance only when military aid from abroad is available. This was the case during World War II, for instance, when the Turks of southern Russia rebelled against the Soviet regime and sided with the Germans. At present only two important centers of resistance exist abroad. One is the so-called National Turkestanian Unity Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Quomitasinin), headed by its president, Veli Kayum Khan, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan; the other is Formosa, the rallying point of all anti-Communists from the mainland.

1. The Turkestanian Unity Committee

Few people in the West are aware of the existence of an East and West Turkistan government-in-exile, which is supported by the Turks of Central Asia and by Turkestanian refugees. Due to their fear of political entanglements with Russia, none of the

N countries bordering Soviet and Chinese Turkestan have given offi-
*668 cial recognition to this government-in-exile. It has its headquar-
669 ters far from Central Asia - in Düsseldorf, West Germany. How-
648 ever, the National Turkestanian Unity Committee is supported
S unofficially by many of the Moslem countries of the Middle East
668 and Central Asia, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
669 Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In each of these
648 countries the Committee maintains a representative office staffed by two members from each Turkish clan from Eastern and Western Turkestan. Iraq is the exception where there is only one representative. In addition to giving financial aid to the exiled government, these countries render assistance in getting Turkestanian refugees temporarily settled. They also allow the establishment of National Turkestanian Unity Committee branches within their borders.

The Committee is composed of ten departments, each of which is under the combined direction of President Veli Khayum Khan and a secretary. These departments are: 1) Organizations and Social Institutions; 2) Science; 3)Information; 4) the Press; 5) Public Health; 6) the Clergy (Turkish: Ulema); 7) Military Affairs; 8) Education, directed cooperatively by all members; 9) Women's Activities; and 10) Foreign Relations, of which Veli Khayun Khan alone is the head.

The spiritual leader of the movement for an independent Turkestan is the famous turkologist Zeki Velidi Togan, who is now a member of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Istanbul. A native of Bashkiria, Zeki Veliki Togan studied and taught Arabic literature at the University of Kazan. In November, 1917, he became president of Bashkiria. In 1922 he led the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule. With their suppression, he fled to Tashkent, and from there to Turkey.

During the Second World War, the National Committee gave Germany effective aid against Russia, but its aim always has been independence from any foreign power. "The Germans, as the enemy of our enemy, were temporarily our friends, but we envisaged this state of affairs only for as long as they were fighting against the Russians." (Milli Turkistan #79B, p. 5). The ultimate goal of the Turkestanian government-in-exile is to liberate all of Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, a territory of about four million square miles with a population of over twenty million. The leaders of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee claim that they are able to maintain contact with the peoples of Central Asia and that messengers frequently cross unguarded mountain passes to take contraband literature to Communist-controlled countries, and return to the West with reliable information of conditions under Communist rule. Naturally, it is difficult to estimate the degree of influence which the National Turkestanian Unity

N Committee holds over the people of Northwest China. Nor is it
*668 possible to predict to what extremes a fanatically nationalistic
669 movement may go in order to establish a Greater Turkestan Em-
648 pire, or the new sufferings which such a Turkic regime may mean
S to others.

[668] 2. Formosa
• [669] Since 1949, Formosa has been the natural center for anti-Com-
[648] munist activities. The Nationalists attempt to maintain contact with the border regions, but it is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of such an espionage or sabotage system. Refugees from the Northwest and elsewhere are given subsidies. Frequently they are employed in the anti-Communist propaganda and planning undertaken by Taipeh. The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs sponsors radio broadcasts to the Northern, Northwestern and Western border regions, and has done most of the planning for the eventual overthrow of the Communist regime. These include, 1) a draft plan for the administration of the border regions during the counter-offensive, 2) a draft plan for anti-Communist work to be handled by the anti-Communist agencies in the border regions (although no details are given about them), and 3) plans for the training of administrative personnel from the border regions. The Commission has also been publishing books and pamphlets on the problems of these areas.

An anti-Communist branch of the China Islam Association also has its headquarters on Formosa. It serves as a center for Moslem refugees from the Northwest, as well as from Inner Mongolia and China Proper.

Aside from these organizations, there are also individuals who possibly may form a nucleus for future anti-Communist leadership. They include such people as General Pai Chung-hsi, who works closely with the China Islam Association on Formosa, Yolbas Khan, one of the Kazakh leaders who fought with Osman Batur, Ma Hung-k'ui, the former governor of Ninghsia who now lives in San Francisco, and Ma Pu-fang, the former governor of Ch'inghai, who escaped to Formosa and thence to Egypt in 1949. The latter two are devout Moslems and have fought actively against the Communists in the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang is remembered for his enlightened rule and is trusted by the Moslems in all parts of the Northwest. (See section Biographies for details on these men).

Thus, the potential organization and leadership for a non-Communist government in the Northwest exists. Their practical value must remain slight as long as the regime in power continues to be centralized and as long as it gives the people enough material benefits to take the place of political freedoms.

BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

Burkhan Shahidi
Chinese name: Pao-erh-han

159 Burkhan was the last governor of Sinkiang under the Nationalist Government, and the first governor of Sinkiang under the Communist regime. He is a Uighur, born in 1894 at Aqsu, Sinkiang. In 1912 he went to Berlin, Germany, and in 1916 was graduated from the University of Berlin specializing in economics and political science. Following his return from Germany, he took different positions in the local government in Sinkiang. Under the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen (1927-1933) he was in charge of foreign affairs. Later he was sent to Germany again to investigate political and economic conditions. Under the administration of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai, for some time, he served as commissioner in the Altai (A-shan) region. In 1937 he was appointed by the Nationalist Government as the consul to Saizan, Soviet Central Asia. When he returned home the next year he was accused by Governor Sheng as a German spy and was imprisoned for seven years until the end of 1944, when Governor Sheng was relieved of his governorship.

159 In the early stages of the Sinkiang disturbances, which lasted
• 69 from 1944 to 1949, Burkhan played a rather insignificant role.
631 Under the administration of Governor Wu Chung-hsin, 1944-1945, he served as deputy commissioner for civil affairs, and later as the political commissioner of the first region. When the Sinkiang disorders developed to such an extent that the Central government had to send a special representative, General Chang Chih-chung, to Sinkiang with the hope of settling the differences between the rebellious tribes in Ining and the so-called Youth Corps of Eastern Turkestan, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as Governor of Sinkiang in 1946, and Burkhan was appointed as one of the lieutenant governors.

The Sinkiang situation continued to develop from bad to worse. Unable to solve the complicated problem, Chang Chih-chung in 1947 recommended Maksud Sabri (Mai-ssu-wu-te) a member of the Kuomintang and a minority leader in Sinkiang, for governor. In May 1947 the Central government appointed Maksud in the hope that he, being a native, could better handle the situation. Rebellious forces, however, aimed their attack
[648] at Maksud. At this crucial time, Burkhan suggested to Chang Chih-chung, who was still political chief for the Nationalist Government in the Northwest, that the only possible way to settle the Sinkiang problem and improve relations between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union was to remove General Sung Hsi-lien,

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159 military commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang. He
669 further hinted that he might be in a position to persuade Russian
648 authorities to render help for developing Sinkiang under Chang's
631 leadership. Thereupon Chang Chih-chung recommended Burkhan as a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government in Nanking, and sent him to Nanking to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador. By December 2, 1948, a secret agreement was reached between Burkhan, as personal representative of Chang Chih-chung, and the Soviet ambassador. The prerequisite of the secret treaty was the removal of the Nationalist commander, Sung Hsi-lien. The important clauses included closer cooperation between Chang Chih-chung and the Chinese Communist Party for the purpose of liberating Sinkiang, and in return, the government of the Soviet Union would give assistance toward reconstruction of Sinkiang. Chang had no choice but to remove both General Sung Hsi-lien and Governor Maksud, and recommend Burkhan as governor of Sinkiang. On December 31, 1948, the Central Government formally appointed Burkhan.

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159 On January 10, 1949, Burkhan officially took over the office.
648 In his open letter to the peoples of Sinkiang, Burkhan stressed
631 the pro-Russia attitude of General Chang Chih-chung. When Chang called a conference of the political and military chiefs in the Northwest, rumors spread that Sinkiang would be given to the Soviet Union or was preparing to surrender to the Communists. When Burkhan returned from the conference he denied all these rumors. By March 1949, the entire situation in the interior of China had made a drastic change. In Sinkiang, prices had

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[458] become extremely high. Burkhan proclaimed his policy of economic self-sufficiency in Sinkiang by issuing silver dollars and silver dollar notes as the new currency and discontinuing use of National gold yüan notes. In May of the same year, Burkhan extended the Sino-Russian Aviation Pact for another five years.

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159 In the meantime Manchuria had been taken by the Communists,
668 and the whole of north China was also put under the control of
669 the Communists with the surrender of General Fu Tso-i, while
631 in Central China, a Soviet regime was also formed. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement from his presidency, and General Li Tsung-jen, vice-president of the Nationalist Government, took over the power and began to negotiate peace with the Communists.

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* [668] In July, 1949, the Communist troops had begun to move into
[669] Kansu Province. On September 23, 1949, the Communist general, Wang Chen, received the surrender of the Nationalist troops at Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu Province. On September 25, two days after the surrender, Burkhan, together with the commander of the Nationalist troops in Sinkiang, cabled to Peiping to announce their severance of relationship from the Nationalist

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159 Government and their readiness to receive orders from the new
668 regime in Peiping. On October 1, 1949, General T'ao Ch'ih-
669 yueh, the commander of the Nationalist garrison in Sinkiang,
631 went to Chiu-ch'uan to welcome the arrival of the Communist general, Wang, Chen, in Sinkiang. On October 2, General P'ang Te-huai flew to Urumchi (Tihua) with General Chang Chih-chung. Burkhan was thus appointed by the Communist regime as the new governor of the people's government of Sinkiang. In October
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[643] 1955, he was elected chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.
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159 Burkhan was a member of the NW MAC, but unlike most of
668 the other officials, he held few concurrent posts. Those he held
631 were president of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, an institution for the training of native cadres, chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association, and a member of the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of Children. His name was missing from the list of notables invited to attend the CPPCC held in Peking in September, 1949, and it was not until the third session of the CPPCC in 1951 that he became a delegate to that body. In 1955, he was deputy chairman of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC, the function of which had already been superceded by the National People's Congress. His name was also absent from the list of members of the presidium of the National People's Congress meeting, held in September 1954.

These facts as well as reports from escapees from Sinkiang indicate that Burkhan was probably only a figurehead in the political structure of Sinkiang under the Communists. In his speeches, however, he has denounced the separatist aspirations of his peoples as well as pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism, long unifying forces in the struggle of the Turkish peoples of Sinkiang, and has repeatedly and vigorously supported the unity of Sinkiang with the rest of China. He was also one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. He relinquished the office as governor of Sinkiang in September 1955, but when, a month later, Saifuddin resigned, he became governor of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

N Cha Hsi: Tibetan, Communist
159 Cha Hsi, a Tibetan, served as a member of the Committee
*668 of Nationalities during the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
631 Border Government from 1937-1945; at the end of 1949, he was appointed a member of the same committee in the Central People's Government, and also appointed a member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and concurrently a member of the Committee of Nationalities in that council. The council was re-organized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative

Maksud Sabri: (1887-)
Chinese name: Mai-ssu-wu-te

159 Among all the different tribes in modern Sinkiang, and particularly among the Uighurs, Maksud is one of the most loyal supporters of the Nationalist Government. He was born at I-ning in 1887. After he had received his Moslem education at the Moslem school in Ili, he went to Turkey where he received comprehensive training including military, medical and scientific studies, at the Constantinople University. When he came back to Sinkiang, he established a number of schools and the Altai hospital. In addition, he encouraged the program for the ahungs (Moslem priests) to study their scripture, and other social welfare. By 1936 he was elected a member of the Kuo-
[631] mintang Central Executive Committee. Since then he has held such positions as member of the Legislative Yüan, councillor of the Central Government, and representative to the People's Political Council. Later he was appointed Commissioner for the Control Yüan in Sinkiang. On May 19, 1947, he was appointed
[635] governor of Sinkiang upon the recommendation of General Chang Chih-chung.

159 This appointment came at the most crucial time, when the
669 province was politically chaotic. The tribes of Sinkiang, particularly the Kazakhs and Uighurs, were agitating for indepen-
635 dence. By January 1945 the so-called Republic of Eastern Tur-
668 kestan was formally set up in I-ning with the aim of taking over the whole of Sinkiang. At the same time, the Communist Party in Sinkiang was officially organized, and the army of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formed. By 1946, a number of cities in northern and western Sinkiang had been lost to the rebels. To cope with such a crisis, the Nationalist Government at Nanking sent General Chang Chih-chung to Sinkiang to negotiate with the I-ning representatives with the hope that the local affair could be settled peacefully. After a number of talks, a peace agreement was finally signed between Chang Chih-chung and the I-ning representatives on January 2, 1946. As a result of this peace agreement, the provincial government of Sinkiang was reorganized with an equal number of members from Uighurs and Chinese in the local government. The peace treaty did not, however, prevent the rebels from further disturbances. Anti-government movements were found everywhere in the province, whereas the so-called Eastern Turkestan Youth Corps was organized throughout the entire Sinkiang. Unable to tackle the situation, Chang finally recommended Maksud as governor of Sinkiang, hoping that, being a minority leader, he might be able to solve the problems.

Maksud took over the administration in May 1947, but the I-ning group continued its revolt. At the same time the Pei-t'a-

159 669 635 668 [648] At the same time the Pei-t'a-shan (Bogdo Baitik) Affair broke out when Outer Mongolian invaders attacked Sinkiang. Meanwhile, the Communists began their revolution in southern Sinkiang. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, Chang Chih-chung continued his retreat. First he removed the commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang, General Sung, then dismissed Maksud as governor and in December 1948 recommended Burkhan, a pro-Russia Uighur, for governor of Sinkiang. With such a political shifting, the whole of Sinkiang was soon taken over by the Communists.

Just before the seizure of Sinkiang by the Chinese Communists, Maksud fled to Formosa where he now resides.

159 648 669 Osman Batur (Usman Batur): Native leader, anti-Communist

A Kazakh, background and early career unknown; 1940, opposed the arrest of Kazakh leaders by Sheng Shih-ts'ai; 1941, revolted in the Altai (A-shan) region and fought off the provincial troops; 1942, defeated; withdrew to the border of Outer Mongolia, arrested and jailed for four months in Outer Mongolia; released upon agreement reached with Outer Mongolian authorities. Organized the Altai Kazakh Restoration Society, organized army with arms and supplies from Outer Mongolia and reportedly from Soviet Russia; 1944, led revolt against the provincial government, captured the cities of Chunuchak (Ta-ch'eng) and Altai (A-shan); with establishment of the East Turkestan Republic at Kulja, Osman was made administrator of the Altai Region with headquarters at Sharasume (Ch'eng-hua) and also given command of the troops in the Altai region; 1948, broke with the leaders of the Ili group who, it was charged, were discriminating against the Kazakhs; led his force of six thousand men to join the Nationalist army; stationed at Peitashan (Bogdo Baitik). June 1948, his capture of eight Outer Mongolian soldiers who had crossed the broder precipitated Outer Mongolian forces' invasion of Peitashan. Invasion repelled by Osman Batur. 1949-51, led anti-Communist guerrillas against the Communists; March 1950, deputy commander of the East Sinkiang Region Headquarters of the Chinese People's Anti-Communist National Salvation Army; deputy commander of the First Front Army; July 1950, covered the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces into the Chinghai-Tibetan border and eventual flight to India; February 1951, ambushed and captured by Communist forces; April 1951, publicly executed at Urumchi by the Communists.

Osman Batur was the best military commander of the Ili insurrectionists and apparently a man who had the interests of his fellow Kazakhs at heart. He split with his colleagues such as Akhmejan Kasimi and Saifuddin, who were at that time making overtures toward the Chinese Communists and Soviet

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159 authorities. Moreover, Osman was not given a post in the gov-
648 ernment of the East Turkestan Republic, but only a regional
669 post, despite the fact that he had helped in the establishment of the republic, and his Kazakhs were discriminated against. When he joined the Chinese Nationalist Army and repulsed the Outer Mongolian invasion, he was hailed throughout China as a hero. Later, he was the rallying point of the resistance of the Kazakhs and other anti-Communist forces in Sinkiang.

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159 Pai Hai-feng: Mongol, army officer

A native of Jehol Province and a member of the Kharchin Banner of the Mongol tribe in Inner Mongolia. Dates unknown. Graduated from the first class of the Central Military Academy; went to Russia and studied in the Oriental University. 1931-1932, served in the Peiping Branch of the National Military Council; later succeeded Yun Chi-hsien as commander of the Mongolian
N Police of Pai-ling-miao, Suiyuan. During the war period, 1937-
[701] 1945, when the police were reorganized into a brigade of the regular army, he served as commanding officer of the brigade and was eventually promoted to commander of a division. In the meantime, also served as a special representative of the Kuomintang to the Mongol Banners in Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces as well as the representative of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps for that region. 1943, resigned from his duties with the Kuomintang Party.

N When the Communists took over North China in 1949, he
159 served as a member of the Military and Administrative Council
631 of the Northwest, and as vice-director of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1953, a member of the Northwest Administrative Council, and vice-dean of the Northwest Nationalities College.

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159 Pai Ju-ping: Communist
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*668 A native of Shensi Province; dates unknown. During the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government, served as the director of financial affairs in the Administrative Commissioner's Office in western Shensi, and later as finance commissioner in the border government. 1950, when the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest was formed, he served as a member of the council and as director of the Department of Finance. In January 1953, the Northwest Administrative Council was established to replace the Military and Political Council of the Northwest. He serves as a member of that council and concurrently as vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission in the council. 1955, director of the Central Handicraft Administrative Bureau in the State Council.

159 668 631 trative Council, he became vice-chairman of the council. In the province of Sinkiang, he was from 1950 to 1955 vice-chairman of the provincial People's Government, director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Provincial People's Government, and commander of the Fifth Army. In 1955 he was elected chairman of the first session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee, which did the ground work in preparing the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In October 1955, when the SUAR was formally inaugurated, he was elected the chairman, but after a month, for reasons unknown, he resigned and Burkhan Shahidi again became chairman.

Saifuddin's membership in the Chinese Communist Party was disclosed in 1950, but he may have been an undercover agent before. He served as the fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP (later reorganized as the Sinkiang Committee) from 1950.

In the mass organizations, Saifuddin is chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and he was also a member of the national committee of the China Peace Committee, an organization formed to carry out the Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign. Since December 1954 he has been one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

159 668 [69] Saifuddin's rise to recognition started from the revolt at Ili in 1944 when the so-called People's Committee for the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was organized in opposition to the provincial government of Sinkiang and also to the Nationalist Government. Saifuddin was appointed Minister of Education at that time and was also in charge of the Youth Corps. By January 1945 the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally established. Saifuddin was one of the lieutenants of Akmedjan Kasimi, a leader in the Ili coalition, who in 1948 organized his supporters into the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, and became editor of its organ, The Progressive Daily. When Akhmedjan and two others were killed in a plane crash en route to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September 1949, Saifuddin assumed the leadership of the Sinkiang League which, in 1950, was renamed the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and which furnished seventeen thousand experienced minority cadres to staff the government agencies in Sinkiang. Through their efforts, the Ili region in Sinkiang forged ahead of the rest of the province in land reform, in collectivization, in the recruitment of activists into the ranks of the cadres, and in meeting the requirements for the establishment of regional autonomy.

How trustworthy and loyal are the members of the Sinkiang League to the Communist cause is, however, still a question. The fact that many of them still entertain separatist opinions

159 668 may be seen in the speeches of Saifuddin and Burkhan, exhorting them to abandon their opposition to Chinese rule and forswear their pan-Turkanistic and pan-Islamic views, which were denounced as reactionary. Although Saifuddin has climbed high in the Communist heirarchy and holds concurrent positions in the central government, the regional and provincial government and also the Communist Party, his power rests upon his following, and the fact that he was unsure of them may have been a reason for his resignation as chairman of the SUAR a month after his election.

159 Sheng Shih-ts'ai

One of the most important modern figures in the political arena of Northwest China during the more recent years is Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Sheng was born in 1895 in the district of K'aiyuan in Liaoning Province in Manchuria, of a middle-class farming family. After he was graduated from an agricultural middle school in Mukden he went to Shanghai to attend the Chinese School of Public Affairs, Chung-kuo kung-hsueh, at Wusung (Woosung), majoring in economics and political sciences, and was graduated in 1915. Unwilling to take part in the civil service examinations under the administration of Yüan Shih-k'ai, he went to Japan to pursue further studies. Shortly the question of Shantung came up in the Versailles Conference, and Sheng was sent back to China as a representative of overseas students to take part in the movement against the transfer of territorial rights to Japan. After the movement was over he joined the Military Academy of Kwangtung at Kukong. His military career began when he served as a second lieutenant in the army of General Kuo Sung-ling in Manchuria. Because of his good record in the army he was chosen to be sent to Japan's Military Academy. In the year of 1925 when Kuo Sung-ling resisted Chang Tso-lin for the latter's pro-Japan attitude, Sheng came back to join Kuo's side. When Kuo was defeated by Chang, Sheng went back to Japan to continue his military training. Chang Tso-lin complained to Japanese authorities and Sheng Shih-ts'ai was ousted from the Military Academy. Thanks to the assistance of Sun Ch'uan-fang, Feng Yu-hsiang (the Christian General) and Chiang Kai-shek, Sheng was able to complete his training.

He came back to China in 1927, just in time to take part in the Northern Expedition launched by Chiang Kai-shek. When the expedition was finally successful he served for a short time in the office of the chief of staff as a section chief. Then he began to seek opportunities in the border areas.

159 669 In 1930 he was invited to Sinkiang where he served first as chief of staff in the office of the commander of Frontier Defense. But his real opportunity came when the Moslem rebel,

159 Ma Chung-ying, attacked Qomul (Hami) and Barkol (Chensi)
• 669 from Kansu Province. Sheng was appointed chief of staff to the Pacification Commander in the eastern region of Sinkiang. Sheng's military training and his experience gained in the Northern Expedition proved him superior to the rebels. When the rebels were defeated, Sheng was promoted to the chief of staff in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In 1932 when the revolts among the Moslems started again in the eastern region of Sinkiang, Sheng was appointed as Pacification Commander in that region. He put down the disturbances in Qomul, relieved Urumchi (Tihua), besieged by the Moslems, and recovered a number of cities such as Turfan and Fu-kang. His reputation and prestige were soon recognized by the peoples of Sinkiang. Finally in 1933, a conspiracy broke out to oppose the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen. Taking this opportunity, Sheng joined forces with the "revolutionaries." As a result, Governor Chin fled and Sheng was appointed as the Provisional Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In September of the same year, Sheng was officially appointed as the Frontier Commander of the Central Government in Nanking.

159 The immediate tasks facing this new leader of Sinkiang were
669 the quelling of insurrections led by General Chang P'ei-yuan of
648 Ili and the rebel Ma Chung-ying of Qomul. To consolidate his newly acquired power, Sheng had to obtain outside help to suppress his internal troubles. So in October 1933, Sheng sent his representatives to Soviet Russia to negotiate with the Russian government for the Red Army to enter Sinkiang and help him. The Soviet Red Army entered Sinkiang in 1933, and by June 1934 the whole of northern Sinkiang was pacified. After the successful conclusion of this military achievement, Sheng Shih-ts'ai
159 allied himself further with Soviet Russia by signing the first
648 secret agreement with the Russian government, on May 26, 1934. The main terms in this secret treaty included the loan of five million rubles to Sheng by the Soviet Union and the employment of Russian advisors and technicians by the Sinkiang government.

[643] During the next ten years, 1933 to 1942, Sheng became abso-
lute ruler of Sinkiang with the full support of the Soviet Union.
159 Immediately after he took over, Sheng proclaimed his eight-
64 point policy: (1) racial equality, (2) freedom of religion, (3) agricultural relief, (4) financial reform, (5) political reform, (6) promotion of education, (7) self-government and (8) improvement of the judicial system. In 1935 he made known his famous "six policies" which would be followed as the guiding principles of his "reconstruction of a new Sinkiang." These six policies were: (1) anti-imperialism, (2) kinship with the Soviet Union, (3) racial equality, (4) peace, (5) honest administration and (6)

159 reconstruction. Following these proclamations and policies
64 Sheng made some drastic changes, such as the employment of minority groups in the government offices, appointments of Communists from Yenan (then headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party), and the use of Russian advisors and technicians. In the military maneuvers, Sheng invited the so-called Eighth
• [669] Regiment of the Red Army to Sinkiang to help in the suppression of another rebel, Ma Hu -shan, of Khotan (Hotien) in 1937. Thus Sheng Shih-ts'ai finally put both the southern and northern parts of Sinkiang under his rule, and the whole of Sinkiang, during these ten years, was under the influence of the Soviet Union.

159 The year 1941 marked another turn which ended the rule of
648 Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang and restored the normal relationship between Sinkiang and the Nationalist Government. Sheng severed his tie with his Soviet ally. This decision was obviously not accidental. There were several factors which forced Sheng to his drastic action. First and most significant was the gradual encroachment of power by the Soviet agents and the rumored "conspiracy" initiated by the Russian military advisors and aimed at Sheng. The second was a series of murders carried out by Soviet agents against Sheng's associates, including his own brother, Sheng Shih-ch'i. The third factor was the international situation. Hitler's armies in Europe were deep in Soviet Russia, and Japan was reported to be preparing for another front against Russia in Siberia. Thus the position of the Soviet
159 Union, Sheng's ally, was at its lowest ebb. The fourth factor was a series of visits by representatives from the Nationalist Government, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and their arguments. When Sheng made his decision, he sent notice to the Eighth Regiment of the Red Army stationed at Hami to evacuate Sinkiang. In the meantime he began to get rid of the Communist officers in the local government. In the early spring of 1943, a group of government officials sent from Chungking arrived in Urumchi. By the end of 1943 the turn-over was completed, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai once again threw himself into the embrace of the central government.

In August 1944, however, when the news of the defeat of the Germans by Soviet troops reached Sinkiang, Sheng staged another incident. He charged the group of officials sent by the central government with pro-Communist activities and put them in jail, then reported to the central government in Chungking. Fortunately, this time the situation was completely under the control of the central government. A few days later, on August
[645] 29, 1944, the central government appointed Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and sent a special plane for him. On September 11, Sheng, accompanied by General Chu Shao-liang, regional commander of the Northwest, and Hsu En-

000 one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

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701 T'ao Ch'ih-yueh: Army officer

A native of Hunan, dates unknown. Graduate of Whampao Military Academy; 1936, commanding officer of the Eighth Division, Nationalist Army; 1945-49, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison; 1949-, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the Sinkiang Military Area, and commanding officer of the 22nd Army Group; 1949-, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and member of the Government Council of the People's Government of Sinkiang; 1951-, member of the National Committee, People's Political Consultative Conference; 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council.

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701 During the Nationalist administration, T'ao was never in a very important position in the army. His rise to fame began when General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Nationalist Government, conducted peace talks with the local leaders of Sinkiang from 1946-1949. At this time T'ao, succeeding General Sung Hsi-lien, became the commander of the garrison forces in Sinkiang. When the defense of the Northwest by the Nationalist troops was broken down by the victorious Communist army, T'ao took the lead of all military and political leaders of Sinkiang to switch his allegiance and support to the Communist regime in Peking. On September 26, 1949, he made his public announcement in which he separated Sinkiang's relationship from the Nationalist regime and gave his whole support to the Peking regime. And on October 1, 1949, he went to Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu, to welcome the commanding officer of the People's Liberation Army, General Wang Chen, to Sinkiang. His troops were then reorganized into the 22nd Army Group, which he still commands, but which was later disarmed and transformed into "production corps." T'ao was elected to the CPPCC in 1951. He was a member of the NW MAC (later the Northwest Administrative Council) and in 1955, a member of the National Defense Council.

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701 Teng Pao-san: Army officer

A native of Kansu Province; dates unknown. 1927, deputy commander-in-chief of the Preparatory Army for National Construction under the command of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General. 1930, deputy commissioner in the Pacification Headquarters of Shensi Province. 1937, deputy commander of Suiyuan War Area under General Fu Tso-i, stationed in Paotou, Suiyuan; 1948, 1949, during the Communist advance in 1949 he gave up his city and fled. Later he defected from the Nationalists. Delegate to the CPPCC; appointed chairman in the People's Government of Kansu Province and re-elected to the same

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669 arrived in Sian in November 1868. From 1867 to 1872, for six years, Tso fought with the Mohammedans, and finally in February, 1871, the headquarters of the Mohammedans, Chin-chi-pao, was taken by Tso's troops and their leader, Ma Hua-lung, was executed. In August 1872, Tso finally arrived in Lanchou, Kansu. By November 1873, the whole province of Kansu was liberated from the Mohammedans, and Tso was made the associate grand secretary. In 1874 he was promoted to full grand
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[669] secretary. In 1875 the trouble in Sinkiang broke out, and Tso was ordered to take charge of the military affairs of that area. After all the preparations were made, Tso began moving his troops westward to Sinkiang, and by 1877, both the northern and
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[554] southern regions of T'ien-shan were recovered. In 1878, the whole region of Sinkiang was restored and Tso was awarded by promotion to second class marquis (hou) and his lieutenant, Liu
N Chin-t'ang, was made a baron. In 1880, when Tseng Chi-tse
159 was sent to Russia by the Manchu government for the second
[648] negotiation of the return of Ili which the Russians occupied during the Turkestan uprising, Tso was ordered to move his troops to stand by for any eventuality. But in August 1880, Tso was suddenly summoned back to Peking. He arrived at the capital in February 1881, and was appointed to serve in the Grand Council and the Tsungli yamen. In 1881 he was appointed governor-general of Kiangnan and Kiangsi. In 1883, he quelled a minor uprising in southern Shantung. By August 1884, the conflict with France began and the coast of Fukien became seriously involved, so Tso was once again appointed high commissioner of that province, and in December 1884 he arrived in Foochow. In the spring of 1885, negotiations with the French were resumed and by June 9, 1885, a treaty was signed by Li Hung-chang with the French representative. In September 1885, Tso died in Foochow. He was granted all posthumous honors and was canonized as Wen-hsiang.

The achievements of Tso Tsung-t'ang in the Northwest can be summarized briefly in the following points; First, his military achievements had consolidated the political control of the Manchu Dynasty in the north. The pacification of the Nien revolts in Chihli and Shantung, the suppression of the Moslem uprising in Shensi and Kansu and the defeat of the Sinkiang rebels, chiefly Pai Yen-hu and Yakub Beg, all contributed heavily to the restoration of Ching power in the Northwest.

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[648] Secondly, his diplomatic triumph in dealing with both Russians and British in Sinkiang had secured that territory under the Chinese administration. During the civil war in Sinkiang,
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159 the Russians occupied Ili and the British supported Yakub Beg
S in the south. At one time when the northern region of T'ien-
669 shan was recovered by Tso-s troops, British diplomats
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159 suggested to the Manchu Government that Yakub Beg's realm be
S recognized as a protectorate state. But Tso Tsung-t'ang frus-
669 trated this attempt by defeating Yakub Beg and recovering the
648 territory of southern Sinkiang. When the negotiations for the return of Ili were going on between China and Russia, Tso again moved his troops to Qomul (Hami) to prepare for any possible break of the negotiations and recover Ili by force if necessary. As a result, Ili was returned to China and the whole Sinkiang territory was preserved as a part of China.

N Thirdly, he should be credited for his statesmanlike fore-
159 sight for his proposal of making Sinkiang into a new province on
S an equal footing with the rest of the provinces. On this matter
635 he had memorialized five times to the Ching Government, insisting that Sinkiang must be given the status of a province to defend the border of the Northwest. Although Sinkiang Province was finally established after the death of Tso, the credit must go to him.

N Though his achievements in the Northwest were great, they
159 were of a military nature. Politically and economically speaking Tso's achievements during his twelve long years in the Northwest were rather limited and insignificant. He was primarily a military man. Though he held positions as governor or governor general, his primary duty was involved in the pacification of bandits and uprisings. His importance in the history of modern Northwest China should not be minimized, however, but should be recognized and praised.

Veli Kajum-Khan: Anti-Communist political leader

S Born in 1904 in Tashkent, a member of an old aristocratic
159 Uzbek clan. 1921, went to Germany, graduated from the agricultural school of Berlin and from the school of foreign affairs of the Berlin University. 1926, sentenced to death in absentia by Soviet authorities in Samarkand; 1925-41, active in the publishing field, in politics and in the Turkistan liberation movement; until 1940, publisher of the newspaper "Der Nähe Osten," and an information bulletin on Turkistan. Since 1941, concerned
S with the work of looking after the welfare and expediting the
159 liberation of Turkistanian prisoners of war in Germany; 1945,
668 organized ex-prisoners into the nucleus of the National Turki-
648 stanian Union Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Qomitasinin) located at Bonn am Rhein; head of the Committee; founder of the Turkistanian Legion; 1945-47, served as a witness at the International Trials at Nürnberg; 1947, re-elected head of the National Turkistanian Unity Committee; 1953, re-elected president of the Turkistanian refugee organization.

Veli Kajum-Khan, as founder and director of the Turkistanian Legion, has directed more than 180,000 Turkistanian exiles

3:Cable & French M-5 (1926) 1927 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI 1

fatigue, and were wont to vent their irritation on the mules. We had an interesting lesson in animal psychology when one of the drivers went a little too far in beating a mule, whose feelings he injured more than its body. It quietly went on strike, and though it walked with the team, yet kept the traces so slack as to bring no ' pull ' upon the cart. The Chinese understood the situation at once. ' It's temper is up ! ' they said, ' and we must take it out of the traces and walk it for a bit.' This they did, but the animal did not recover itself until it had been ridden for a few hours, received an extra feed, and been petted. After this acknowledgment of unjust treatment, it recovered its ' face,' and went to work again ! Little Molly always held herself aloof from the common herd, only associating with her own shaft-mule. Her spirit was splendid, and she pulled with an energy that was foreign to the baser sort. Both men and beasts were needing the long rest which lay before them at Urumchi.

We had been without the guiding telegraph wire ever since we parted from it at Tsikioking, but at Kucheng we met with it once more, and we were glad of its indication over the rolling steppes which we now so frequently crossed. A new feature of the road was the little Ili Valley cart, of a build unfamiliar to us. The fact that it had four wheels gave it a Western look, for all Chinese carts, large or small, are built on two wheels, and this new structure was unknown to most of our party, who were as delighted as children to see this departure from the agelong, traditional vehicle.

Leaving Santai, an hour's drive brought us to the site of the original town of that name, now a mass of crumbling ruins, one more reminder of the havoc and desolation wrought by the Moslem rebellion in 1862–1877. Ruined villages, hamlets and farmsteads, mark

3:Cable & French M-5 (1926) 1927 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI 1

the route taken by the hordes of the Tungan rebels, as they marched from South Kansu to Turkestan, mercilessly exterminating the Chinese population, razing their villages to the ground, and carrying off many of the women and boys as trophies of war.

Leaving the little '*hsien*' city of Fukang—'The Mound of Peace'—we realised with delight that only one more night in an inn lay between us and the Mission Compound in Urumchi, where we should find a bed, sheets, bathing facilities in the place of the small tin basin which we carried, and the possibilities of getting our clothes washed. At Kumuti—'Ancient Pastures' we were but twenty miles from the city, but when it was suggested that we should only take a brief rest and then press on, we felt that we simply could not do it. The best room in the inn was occupied by a Nogai gentleman, whom we had met two years previously in Ansi. Unfamiliar as we were then with Asian tribes, we had mistaken him for a pure Russian, and therefore had been much puzzled when he told us that he was a Moslem. His horse was ready saddled, as he was leaving for the capital, which he could reach by nightfall, and he was glad to be the first to announce our whereabouts. The name of Kumuti, meaning 'Ancient Pastures' indicates that in olden days the flocks and herds of the Uigur chiefs were grazed in this place.

Dawn saw us again on the road, thrilled at the prospect of so soon seeing the great capital of Sinkiang, on which our thoughts has so often centred as we pictured the base from which Mr. Hunter and Mr. Mather had carried on their missionary operations for so many years. Mr. Mather had now been in China for sixteen years without taking any furlough, and considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon him to return for a short period to England. This,